Climate policy design must balance emissions mitigation with concerns for fairness, particularly as climate change disproportionately affects the poorest households within and across countries. Integrated Assessment Models used for global climate policy evaluation have so far typically not considered inequality effects within countries. To fill this gap, we develop a global Integrated Assessment Model representing national economies and subnational income, mitigation cost, and climate damage distribution and assess a range of climate policy schemes with varying levels of effort sharing across countries and households. The schemes are consistent with limiting temperature increases to 2 °C and account for the possibility to use carbon tax revenues to address distributional effects within and between countries. We find that carbon taxation with redistribution improves global welfare and reduces inequality, with the most substantial gains achieved under uniform taxation paired with global per capita transfers. A Loss and Damage mechanism offers significant welfare improvements in vulnerable countries while requiring only a modest share of global carbon revenues in the medium term. The poorest households within all countries may benefit from the transfer scheme, in particular when some redistribution is made at the country level. Our findings underscore the potential for climate policy to advance both environmental and social goals, provided revenue recycling mechanisms are effectively implemented. In particular, they demonstrate the feasibility of a welfare improving global climate policy involving limited international redistribution.

Climate change and inequality are critical and interrelated issues. Despite growing empirical evidence on the distributional implications of climate policies and climate risks, mainstream model-based assessments are often silent on the interplay between climate change and economic inequality. Here we fill this gap through an ensemble of eight large-scale integrated assessment models that belong to different economic paradigms and feature income heterogeneity. We quantify the distributional implications of climate impacts and of the varying compensation schemes of climate policies compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement. By 2100, climate impacts will increase inequality by 1.4 points of the Gini index on average. Maintaining global mean temperature below 1.5 °C reduces long-term inequality increase by two-thirds but increases it slightly in the short term. However, equal per-capita redistribution can offset the short-term effect, lowering the Gini index by almost two points. We quantify model uncertainty and find robust evidence that well-designed policies can help stabilize climate and promote economic inclusion.

This paper examines the macroeconomic and distributional effects of the European Union’s transition to Net Zero emissions through a gradually increasing carbon tax. I develop a New Keynesian Environmental DSGE model with two household types and distinct energy and non-energy sectors. Five alternative uses of carbon tax revenues are considered: equal transfers to households, targeted transfers to Hand-to-Mouth households, subsidies to green energy firms, and reductions in labor and capital income taxes. In the absence of technological progress, the carbon tax policy induces a persistent increase in energy prices and a reduction in GDP, investment, and consumption. Headline inflation falls below zero in the medium run, reflecting weaker aggregate demand. Distributional outcomes vary significantly depending on the implemented revenue recycling scheme: targeted transfers are the most progressive but entail larger macroeconomic costs, while subsidies and tax cuts mitigate output and investment losses but are less effective in narrowing the consumption gap. A limited foresight scenario, in which agents learn about policy targets sequentially, generates more volatile adjustment paths and temporary inflationary spikes around announcements, but long-run outcomes remain close to the baseline.

In this paper, we discuss how environmental damage and emission reduction policies affect the conduct of monetary policy in a two-sector (clean and dirty) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In particular, we examine the optimal response of the interest rate to changes in sectoral inflation due to standard supply shocks, conditional on a given environmental policy. We then compare the performance of a nonstandard monetary rule with sectoral inflation targets to that of a standard Taylor rule. Our main results are as follows: first, the optimal monetary policy is affected by the existence of environmental policy (carbon taxation), as this introduces a distortion in the relative price level between the clean and dirty sectors. Second, compared with a standard Taylor rule targeting aggregate inflation, a monetary policy rule with asymmetric responses to sector-specific inflation allows for reduced volatility in the inflation gap, output gap, and emissions. Third, a nonstandard monetary policy rule allows for a higher level of welfare, so the two goals of welfare maximization and emission minimization can be aligned.