Regulierung internationaler Finanzmärkte und Banken
Die Forschungsgruppe gehört zum IWH-Forschungscluster Finanzstabilität und Regulierung. Diese Gruppe analysiert Ursachen und Konsequenzen von internationalen Aktivitäten von Banken sowie den regulatorischen Rahmen, innerhalb dessen globale Banken operieren.
International aktive Banken können eine effiziente internationale Kapitalallokation vereinfachen und zur internationalen Risikoteilung beitragen. Allerdings können sie auch Instabilitäten generieren und zu einer Übertragung von Schocks über nationale Grenzen hinaus beitragen. Dies ist einer der Gründe für die aktuelle Re-Regulierung des internationalen Bankensystems.
Die Forschungsgruppe trägt auf drei verschiedenen Wegen zur Literatur bei. Erstens analysiert die Gruppe empirisch, warum internationale Banken global aktiv sind und wie Schocks im Finanzsystem übertragen werden. Zweitens untersucht die Gruppe das Entstehen von systemischen Risiken und Ungleichgewichten im integrierten Bankenmarkt und die sich daraus ergebenden Konsequenzen für die Realwirtschaft. Drittens werden die Auswirkungen von Änderungen bezüglich der Bankenaufsicht und Bankenregulierung analysiert, mit einem besonderen Fokus auf dem europäischen Integrationsprozess
IWH-Datenprojekt: International Banking Library
ForschungsclusterFinanzstabilität und Regulierung
01.2015 ‐ 12.2017
Dynamic Interactions between Banks and the Real Economy
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)
01.2017 ‐ 12.2022
The Political Economy of the European Banking Union
Europäischer Sozialfonds (ESF)
Too Connected to Fail? Inferring Network Ties from Price Co-movements
in: Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, im Erscheinen
We use extreme value theory methods to infer conventionally unobservable connections between financial institutions from joint extreme movements in credit default swap spreads and equity returns. Estimated pairwise co-crash probabilities identify significant connections among up to 186 financial institutions prior to the crisis of 2007/2008. Financial institutions that were very central prior to the crisis were more likely to be bailed out during the crisis or receive the status of systemically important institutions. This result remains intact also after controlling for indicators of too-big-to-fail concerns, systemic, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. Both CDS-based and Equity-based connections are significant predictors of bailouts.
Cross-border Transmission of Emergency Liquidity
in: Journal of Banking & Finance, im Erscheinen
We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.
Political Influence and Financial Flexibility: Evidence from China
in: Journal of Banking & Finance, 2019
This paper investigates how political influence affects firms’ financial flexibility and speed of adjustment toward target leverage ratios. We find that at the macro level, firms in environments with high political advantages, proxied by provincial affiliations with heads of state as well as political status and party rank of provincial leaders, adjust faster. At the micro level, firms that are state-owned, have CPC members as executives, or bear low exposure to changes in political uncertainty adjust faster. When interacted, the micro-level political factors have more significant impact.
International Banking and Cross-border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany
in: International Journal of Central Banking, Supplement 1, March 2017
We analyze the inward and outward transmission of regulatory changes through German banks’ (international) loan portfolio. Overall, our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments. These spillovers are, however, quite heterogeneous between types of banks and can only be observed for some instruments. For instance, domestic affiliates of foreign-owned global banks reduce their loan growth to the German economy in response to a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements, and loan-to-value ratios in their home country. Furthermore, from the point of view of foreign countries, tightening reserve requirements is effective in reducing lending inflows from German banks. Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions.
Bank Risk Proxies and the Crisis of 2007/09: A Comparison
in: Applied Economics Letters, Nr. 7, 2017
The global financial crisis has again shown that it is important to understand the emergence and measurement of risks in the banking sector. However, there is no consensus in the literature which risk proxy works best at the level of the individual bank. A commonly used measure in applied work is the Z-score, which might suffer from calculation issues given poor data quality. Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk.
Interactions Between Regulatory and Corporate Taxes: How Is Bank Leverage Affected?
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 16, 2018
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 24, 2017
To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.
Do Conventional Monetary Policy Instruments Matter in Unconventional Times?
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 12, 2017
This paper investigates how declines in the deposit facility rate set by the European Central Bank (ECB) affect bank behavior. The ECB aims to reduce banks’ incentives to hold reserves at the central bank and thus to encourage loan supply. However, given depressed margins in a low interest environment, banks might reallocate their liquidity toward more profitable liquid assets other than traditional loans. Our analysis is based on a sample of euro area banks for the period from 2009 to 2014. Three key findings arise. First, banks reduce their reserve holdings following declines in the deposit facility rate. Second, this effect is heterogeneous across banks depending on their business model. Banks with a more interest-sensitive business model are more responsive to changes in the deposit facility rate. Third, there is evidence of a reallocation of liquidity toward loans but not toward other liquid assets. This result is most pronounced for non-GIIPS countries of the euro area.
Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and European perspectives differ?
in: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers, Nr. 9, 2017
In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.
Inside Asset Purchase Programs: The Effects of Unconventional Policy on Banking Competition
in: ECB Working Paper Series, Nr. 2017, 2017
We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.