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So viel kostet FremdenfeindlichkeitReint GroppSüddeutsche Zeitung, 1. September 2026
The experience of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) during the global financial crisis and in the resulting European debt crises has been largely different from that of other European countries. This paper looks at the specifics of the CEEC in recent history and focuses in particular on the appropriateness of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure for this group of countries. In doing so, the macroeconomic situation in the CEEC is highlighted and macroeconomic problems faced by these countries are extracted. The findings are compared to the results of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure of the European Commission. It is shown that while the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure correctly identifies some of the problems, it understates or overstates other problems. This is due to the specific construction of the broadened surveillance procedure, which largely disregarded the specifics of catching-up economies.
The European Commission’s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system (EWS). That allows for analyzing the preferences of the involved politicians with regard to the two potential errors of an EWS – missing a crisis and issuing a false alarm. This is done for the first time for EWS in general by using a standard signals approach including a preference-based optimization approach to set thresholds. It is shown that in general, the thresholds of the scoreboard are set low (resulting in more alarm signals) as compared to a neutral stand.
The signals approach as an early warning system has been fairly successful in detecting crises, but it has so far failed to gain popularity in the scientific community because it does not distinguish between randomly achieved in-sample fit and true predictive power. To overcome this obstacle, we test the null hypothesis of no correlation between indicators and crisis probability in three applications of the signals approach to different crisis types. To that end, we propose bootstraps specifically tailored to the characteristics of the respective datasets. We find (1) that previous applications of the signals approach yield economically meaningful and statistically significant results and (2) that composite
indicators aggregating information contained in individual indicators add value to the signals approach, even where most individual indicators are not statistically significant on their own.
European authorities and scholars published proposals on which indicators of macroeconomic imbalances might be used to uncover risks for the sustainability of public debt in the European Union. We test the ability of four proposed sets of indicators to send early-warnings of debt crises using a signals approach for the study of indicators and the construction of composite indicators. We find that a broad composite indicator has the highest predictive power. This fact still holds true if equal weights are used for the construction of the composite indicator in order to reflect the uncertainty about the origin of future crises.
In this paper we test the ability of three of the most popular methods to forecast the South African currency crisis of June 2006. In particular we are interested in the out-ofsample performance of these methods. Thus, we choose the latest crisis to conduct an out-of-sample experiment. In sum, the signals approach was not able to forecast the outof- sample crisis of correctly; the probit approach was able to predict the crisis but just with models, that were based on raw data. Employing a Markov-regime-switching approach also allows to predict the out-of-sample crisis. The answer to the question of which method made the run in forecasting the June 2006 currency crisis is: the Markovswitching approach, since it called most of the pre-crisis periods correctly. However, the “victory” is not straightforward. In-sample, the probit models perform remarkably well and it is also able to detect, at least to some extent, out-of-sample currency crises before their occurrence. It can, therefore, not be recommended to focus on one approach only when evaluating the risk for currency crises.
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die möglichen Effekte der Basel II-Bankenregulierung auf die Transmission von Währungskrisen zu Bankenkrisen. Die Analyse des Beispiels Südkorea zeigt die wichtige Rolle der Unausgeglichenheit von Bankaktiva und -passiva in bezug auf deren Fristigkeit und Währung bei diesem Transmissionsprozess und stellt dar wie Basel II auf die Bankenbilanzen gewirkt hätte. Es wird gezeigt, dass die regulatorischen Kapitalanforderungen unter Basel II, aufgrund der guten Kreditratings im Vorfeld der Krise, geringer gewesen wären als unter Basel I. Dadurch wäre die Krise verschärft worden. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird analysiert, ob die Ratingagenturen ihr Verhalten seit dem Versagen bei der Prognose der Asienkrise geändert haben. Dieser Beitrag findet keine empirische Evidenz für eine Berücksichtigung der Unausgeglichenheit in den Bankenbilanzen bei der Ableitung von Ratingergebnissen für Länder. Deshalb muss die Effektivität von Basel II bei der Prävention der Transmission von Währungs- zu Bankenkrisen sowohl im Falle Südkoreas als auch bei möglichen zukünftigen Krisen angezweifelt werden.
Die aktuelle Diskussion zur Reform des Instrumentariums des IWF beinhaltet Vorschläge zur Implementierung eines International-Lender-of-Last-Resort (ILOLR). Die Debatte lässt jedoch offen, wie die konkrete Implementierung erfolgen soll. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert sechs verschiedene ILOLR-Optionen, die Notenbanken im Falle von Währungskrisen unterstützen. Es wird geschlussfolgert, dass direkte Interventionen des ILOLR zur Unterstützung der betroffenen Währung zu bevorzugen sind. Dazu verwendet der IWF eigene Ressourcen und Rechte auf weitere Ziehungen im Bedarfsfall. Als Kriterien werden Momente der Kosteneffizienz wie z.B. Kosten der Zahlerländer, Kosten der Kreditaufnahme, der Intervention und der Sterilisation sowie Moral-Hazard- Probleme berücksichtigt.
Currency crises episodes of 1996, 1998, and 2001 are used to identify common country specific causes of currency crises in South Africa. The paper identifies crises by the use of an Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index as introduced by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996). It extends the Signals Approach introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, 1998) by developing a composite indicator in order to measure the evolution of currency crisis risk in South Africa. The analysis considers the standard suspects from international currency crises and country specifics as identified by the Myburgh Commission (2002) and current literature as potentially relevant indicators.
The paper explores the relationships between economic freedom on the one side and development aid and IMF credit as approximation for conditional aid on the other side. After a short review of current literature on the issue of economic development, economic freedom, aid, and IMF credit, the paper develops a simple panel regression model to evaluate the relationship between “economic freedom” as dependent variable and “aid” and “IMF credit” as independent variables. The estimation is based upon data taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. In contrast to previous research, our results allow the rejection of the hypothesis that IMF credit increases economic freedom and that aid is not contributing to economic freedom. The estimation results suggest that, firstly, aid is positively correlated with economic freedom, and secondly, that IMF credit is negatively correlated with economic freedom. Taking IMF credit as proxy for conditional aid, we conclude that for the period of observation it could not be shown that countries can be forced to economic freedom by aid conditions.
