The Corporate Investment Benefits of Mutual Fund Dual Holdings
Rex Wang Renjie, Patrick Verwijmeren, Shuo Xia
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.
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The Effects of Antitrust Laws on Horizontal Mergers: International Evidence
Chune Young Chung, Iftekhar Hasan, JiHoon Hwang, Incheol Kim
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
This study examines how antitrust law adoptions affect horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws in 20 countries, we find antitrust regulation decreases acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding horizontal merger announcements. A decrease in deal value, target book assets, and industry peers' announcement returns are consistent with the market power hypothesis. Exploiting antitrust law adoptions addresses a downward bias to an estimated effect of antitrust enforcement (Baker (2003)). The potential bias from heterogeneous treatment effects does not nullify our results. Overall, antitrust policies seem to deter post-merger monopolistic gains, potentially improving customer welfare.
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Creditor-control Rights and the Nonsynchronicity of Global CDS Markets
Iftekhar Hasan, Miriam Marra, Eliza Wu, Gaiyan Zhang
Review of Corporate Finance Studies,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.
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State Ownership and Financial Statement Comparability
William Francis, Xian Gu, Iftekhar Hasan, Joon Ho Kong
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,
Nr. 7,
2024
Abstract
This paper investigates how state ownership affects financial reporting practices in China. Using several measures of state (government) ownership, we show that a one-standard-deviation increase in state ownership decreases financial statement comparability by 36.61%, and the impact is more pronounced when the central authority has majority control of the company. Moreover, lower earnings quality and lower levels of accounting conservatism among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may explain the lower accounting comparability between SOEs and non-SOEs (NSOEs). Additionally, similar (different) managerial objectives converge (diverge) financial statement comparability between SOEs and NSOEs. Last, the geographical locations of firms also contribute to financial statement comparability. We employ a difference-in-differences design, changes regression and entropy balancing to mitigate potential endogeneity bias.
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The Effect of Bank Organizational Risk-management on the Price of Non-deposit Debt
Iftekhar Hasan, Emma Peng, Maya Waisman, Meng Yan
Journal of Financial Services Research,
April
2024
Abstract
We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.
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Der Börsengang und die interne Organisation des Unternehmens
Daniel Bias, Benjamin Lochner, Stefan Obernberger, Merih Sevilir
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 1,
2024
Abstract
In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, wie Unternehmen ihre Organisation anpassen, wenn sie erstmalig an die Börse gehen (initial public offering, IPO). Im Zuge des Börsengangs wandeln sich Unternehmen in eine hierarchischere Organisation um und verstärken die Aufsicht durch das Management. Organisatorische Funktionen in den Bereichen Rechnungswesen, Finanzen, Informationstechnologie und Personalwesen gewinnen an Bedeutung. Sie tauschen einen großen Teil ihrer Belegschaft und fast ihr gesamtes Management aus, um ihr Humankapital an die neue Organisation anzupassen. Die neue Organisation erleichtert interne Versetzungen und Beförderungen. Insgesamt ist das Unternehmen durch den Börsengang einem Wandel unterworfen, der die Abhängigkeit des Unternehmens von einzelnen Beschäftigten verringert und den Produktionsprozess effizient organisiert.
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Asymmetric Reactions of Abnormal Audit Fees Jump to Credit Rating Changes
June Cao, Mong Shan Ee, Iftekhar Hasan, He Huang
British Accounting Review,
Nr. 2,
2024
Abstract
Considering the inherent stickiness of abnormal audit fees, our study contributes to the literature by decomposing abnormal audit fees into a jump component and long-run sticky component. We investigate whether and how changes in credit ratings asymmetrically affect the jump component of abnormal audit fees. We document a positive association between rating downgrades and the jump component. We find that heightened bankruptcy risk and misstatement risk are the mechanisms that drive this relationship. Further analysis shows that firms experiencing rating downgrades are more likely to receive a going concern opinion and experience longer audit report lags. Taken together, our findings provide direct evidence that credit ratings are significantly associated with abnormal audit fees, particularly with the jump component. Given the serial correlation of abnormal audit fees, our study sheds light on the importance of disaggregation of the abnormal audit fee residuals into the jump and long-run sticky components.
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Poison Bonds
Rex Wang Renjie, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2024
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of “poison bonds”, which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% since mid-2000s. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Our analysis suggests that this practice entrenches incumbent managers and destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of −7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for the agency theory of debt: (i) more debt may not discipline the management; and (ii) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
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Regulation and Information Costs of Sovereign Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lending Markets
Iftekhar Hasan, Suk-Joong Kim, Panagiotis Politsidis, Eliza Wu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
October
2023
Abstract
We examine the effect of sovereign credit impairments on the pricing of syndicated loans following rating downgrades in the borrowing firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionately adverse impact on the bounded firms' borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms following their sovereign's rating downgrade. Rating-based regulatory frictions partially explain our results. On the supply-side, loans carry a higher spread when granted from low-capital banks, non-bank lenders, and banks with high market power. We further document an operating demand-side channel, contingent on borrowers' size, financial constraints, and global diversification. Our results can be attributed to the relative bargaining power between lenders and borrowers: relationship borrowers and non-bank dependent borrowers with alternative financing sources are much less affected.
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Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt: Evidence From the Chinese Corporate Bond Market
Sris Chatterjee, Xian Gu, Iftekhar Hasan, Haitian Lu
Journal of Empirical Finance,
September
2023
Abstract
Drawing upon evidence from the Chinese corporate bond market, we study how ownership structure affects the cost of debt for firms. Our results show that state, institutional and foreign ownership formats reduce the cost of debt for firms. The benefits of state ownership are accentuated when the issuer is headquartered in a province with highly developed market institutions, operates in an industry less dominated by the state or during the period after the 2012 anti-corruption reforms. Institutional ownership provides the most benefits in environments with lower levels of marketization, especially for firms with low credit quality. Our evidence sheds light on the nexus of ownership and debt cost in a political economy where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs face productivity and credit frictions. It is also illustrative of how the market environment interacts with corporate ownership in affecting the cost of bond issuance.
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