This paper investigates whether cultural norms shaped by religion drive consumer decisions after a corporate scandal. We exploit the unexpected notice of violation by the US Environmental Protection Agency in September 2015, accusing the car producer Volkswagen (VW) to have used software to manipulate car emission values during test phases. Using a difference-in-difference model, we show that new registrations of VW (diesel) cars decline significantly in German counties with a high share of Protestants following the VW scandal. Our results suggest that the enforcement culture rooted in Protestantism affects consumer decisions and penalises corporate fraud.

By conducting a natural field experiment, we analyze the managerial policy of delegating the wage choice to employees. We find that this policy enhances performance significantly, which is remarkable since allocated wage premiums of the same size have no effect at all. Observed self‐imposed wage restraints and absence of negative peer effects speak in favor of wage delegation, although the chosen wage premium levels severely dampen its net value. Additional experimental and survey data provide important insights into employees' underlying motivations.

This article compares the hiring patterns of start-ups and incumbent firms to analyze whether start-ups offer relatively more job opportunities to disadvantaged workers. Using administrative linked employer–employee data for Germany that provide the complete employment biographies of newly hired workers, the authors show that young firms are more likely than incumbents to hire applicants who are older, foreign, or unemployed, or who have unstable employment histories, arrive from outside the labor force, or were affected by a plant closure. Analysis of entry wages shows that penalties for these disadvantaged workers, however, are higher in start-ups than in incumbent firms. Therefore, even if start-ups provide employment opportunities for certain groups of disadvantaged workers, the quality of these jobs in terms of initial remuneration appears to be low.

This study analyses empirically the effects of import competition on firm productivity (TFPQ) using administrative firm-level panel data from German manufacturing. We find that only import competition from high-income countries is associated with positive incentives for firms to invest in productivity improvement, whereas import competition from middle- and low-income countries is not. To rationalise these findings, we further look at the characteristics of imports from the two types of countries and the effects on R&D, employment and sales. We provide evidence that imports from high-income countries are relatively capital-intensive and technologically more sophisticated goods, at which German firms tend to be relatively good. Costly investment in productivity appears feasible reaction to such type of competition and we find no evidence for downscaling. Imports from middle- and low-wage countries are relatively labour-intensive and technologically less sophisticated goods, at which German firms tend to generally be at disadvantage. In this case, there are no incentives to invest in innovation and productivity and firms tend to decline in sales and employment.

Die globale Bankenkrise der Jahre 2008/2009 hatte weltweit signifikant negative Auswirkungen auf die Realwirtschaft, und in vielen Ländern fiel die folgende wirtschaftliche Erholung deutlich langsamer aus als in vorherigen Rezessionen. In den Monaten nach der Insolvenz der amerikanischen Investmentbank Lehman Brothers reduzierten Banken ihre Kreditvergabe an Unternehmen, was zu einem Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit, einem Rückgang an Investitionen und einer Verringerung der Produktivität führte. Während diese kurzfristigen Effekte in der bisherigen Forschung gut dokumentiert sind, sind die langfristigen Auswirkungen von Bankenkrisen bisher weit weniger gut verstanden. Zwei aktuelle Studien unter IWH-Beteiligung zeigen, dass Bankenkrisen generell negative langfristige Effekte auf das Wachstum von Firmen haben, dass die Rettung von schwachen Banken während der Krise mit Produktivitätsverlusten in späteren Jahren einhergeht, und dass diese negativen langfristigen Effekte durch die Existenz inflexibler Löhne verstärkt werden.

Im Jahr 2014 trat die Regulierung zur Deckelung der variablen Vergütung von Bankvorständen in der Europäischen Union (EU) in Kraft. Ziel dieser Regulierung ist es, die Anreize zur übermäßigen Risikoübernahme zu vermindern. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob die Regulierung ihr erklärtes Ziel erreichen konnte und ob sie zudem mit unbeabsichtigten Konsequenzen einherging. Der Vergleich der Vergütungsniveaus vor und nach Einführung der Deckelung zeigt: Banken haben ihre Vorstände für den Verlust variabler Vergütung mit einer permanenten Erhöhung fixer Vergütungsbestandteile entschädigt. Gleichzeitig nahm die risikogewichtete Rentabilität betroffener Institute ab, was auf ein höheres Eigenrisiko zurückzuführen ist. Abgesichert durch hohe Fixgehälter gehen Banker offenbar höhere Risiken ein. Der befürchtete Exodus talentierter Banker aus Europa blieb aus.

This paper uses administrative data to analyze a large employer-borne payroll tax rate cut for young workers in Sweden. We find no effect on net-of-tax wages of young treated workers relative to slightly older untreated workers, and a 2–3 percentage point increase in youth employment. Firms employing many young workers receive a larger tax windfall and expand right after the reform: employment, capital, sales, and profits increase. These effects appear stronger in credit-constrained firms. Youth-intensive firms also increase the wages of all their workers collectively, young as well as old, consistent with rent sharing of the tax windfall.

We propose a resolution of the missing deflation puzzle. Our resolution stresses the importance of nonlinearities in price- and wage-setting when the economy is exposed to large shocks. We show that a nonlinear macroeconomic model with real rigidities resolves the missing deflation puzzle, while a linearized version of the same underlying nonlinear model fails to do so. In addition, our nonlinear model reproduces the skewness of inflation and other macroeconomic variables observed in post-war U.S. data. All told, our results caution against the common practice of using linearized models to study inflation and output dynamics.

In this paper, we document the forecasting performance of estimated basic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and compare this to extended versions which consider alternative expectation formation assumptions and financial frictions. We also show how standard model features, such as price and wage rigidities, contribute to forecasting performance. It turns out that neither alternative expectation formation behaviour nor financial frictions can systematically increase the forecasting performance of basic DSGE models. Financial frictions improve forecasts only during periods of financial crises. However, traditional price and wage rigidities systematically help to increase the forecasting performance.