In this paper we analyze the relationship between turnover-driven growth and subjective well-being. Our model of innovation-led growth and unemployment predicts that: (i) the effect of creative destruction on expected individual welfare should be unambiguously positive if we control for unemployment, less so if we do not; (ii) job creation has a positive and job destruction has a negative impact on well-being; (iii) job destruction has a less negative impact in areas with more generous unemployment insurance policies; and (iv) job creation has a more positive effect on individuals that are more forward-looking. The empirical analysis using cross sectional MSA (metropolitan statistical area)-level and individual-level data provide empirical support to these predictions.

The contribution of this thesis is to widen the focus of the literature on related variety. So far, this line of research has a strong focus on technological relatedness and cognitive proximity (Boschma et al. 2015). This thesis puts emphasis on three dimensions of relatedness that not yet been at the heart of research: input-output linkages and vertically related variety, the occupational dimensions of relatedness as well as insights from a project level R&D efforts and their relevance for the analysis of technological relatedness. We contribute to the understanding of how the specific composition and the degree of relatedness of economic agents in space shape their ability to generate variety in terms of entry of new occupational specialisations in regions. We enhance the understanding of how related variety affects different regional outcomes such employment growth and innovation and offer insights into the structure of inter-industry relations from a technological perspective and explains how the rise of certain technologies shapes inter-industry relatedness patterns.

Technological progress builds upon itself, with the expansion of invention in one domain propelling future work in linked fields. Our analysis uses 1.8 million US patents and their citation properties to map the innovation network and its strength. Past innovation network structures are calculated using citation patterns across technology classes during 1975–1994. The interaction of this preexisting network structure with patent growth in upstream technology fields has strong predictive power on future innovation after 1995. This pattern is consistent with the idea that when there is more past upstream innovation for a particular technology class to build on, then that technology class innovates more.

We study the effect of top tax rates on “superstar” inventors’ international mobility since 1977, using panel data on inventors from the US and European Patent Offices. We exploit the differential impact of changes in top tax rates on inventors of different qualities. Superstar inventors' location choices are significantly affected by top tax rates. In our preferred specification, the elasticity to the net-of-tax rate of the number of domestic superstar inventors is around 0.03, while that of foreign superstar inventors is around 1. These elasticities are larger for inventors in multinational companies. An inventor is less sensitive to taxes in a country if his company performs a higher share of its research there.

We show that venture capitalists' (VCs) on-site involvement with their portfolio companies leads to an increase in both innovation and the likelihood of a successful exit. We rule out selection effects by exploiting an exogenous source of variation in VC involvement: the introduction of new airline routes that reduce VCs' travel times to their existing portfolio companies. We confirm the importance of this channel by conducting a large-scale survey of VCs, of whom almost 90% indicate that direct flights increase their interaction with their portfolio companies and management, and help them better understand companies' activities.

Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner.

Der Staat fragt Produkte und Dienstleistungen mit ganz unterschiedlichem technologischen Niveau nach – von Büroklammern bis zu Forschungssatelliten. Dieser Beitrag zeigt zunächst in einem theoretischen Modell, dass der Staat durch die technologische Intensität seiner Nachfrage den Markt für technologieintensive Produkte und Dienstleistungen erweitern kann. Denn eine stärkere staatliche Nachfrage nach innovativen Produkten und Dienstleistungen erlaubt es privaten Unternehmen, die überwiegend fixen Kosten für Forschung und Entwicklung auf größere Absatzmengen umzulegen, lässt die privaten Erträge aus Forschung und Entwicklung ansteigen und generiert somit zusätzliche Anreize, in die Entwicklung neuer Technologien zu investieren. Anhand von Daten aus den USA wird auch empirisch belegt, dass eine – budgetneutrale – Erhöhung der technologischen Intensität der staatlichen Nachfrage die privaten FuE-Ausgaben erhöht. Damit rückt die staatliche Nachfrage erneut in die Diskussion über mögliche Instrumente einer effektiven Wirtschafts- und Innovationspolitik.

Der Euroraum verharrt in einer tiefen, vierfachen Krise. Die erste ist eine Wachstumskrise. Im Euroraum liegt die wirtschaftliche Leistung immer noch unterhalb des Niveaus von vor der Finanzkrise 2008. Zudem leidet der Euroraum weiterhin unter hoher Arbeitslosigkeit und zu niedriger Inflation. Der Euroraum leidet außerdem unter einem zu geringen Produktivitätswachstum, vor allem bei den Dienstleistungen. Es fehlt hier an Innovationsdynamik und Investitionen.