Containment measures of COVID-19 have generated a chain of supply and demand shocks around the globe with heterogeneous fallout across industries and countries. We quantify their transmission via foreign trade with a focus on the euro area where deep firms integration within regional supply chains and strong demand linkages act as a magnification mechanism. We estimate that spillover effects in the euro area from suppression measures in one of the five main euro area countries range between 15-28% the size of the original shock; negative foreign demand shocks depress euro area aggregate activity by about a fifth the size of the external shock and a fourth of the total effect is due to indirect propagation through euro area supply chain. Last, reopening to regional tourism softened the contraction of aggregate activity due to travel and tourism bans by about a third in the euro area. Our findings suggest that enhanced coordination of recovery plans would magnify their beneficial effects.

Economies of scale can explain compensation differentials over time, across firms of different size, different hierarchy-levels, and different industries. Consequently, the most talented individuals tend to match with the largest firms in industries where marginal returns to their talent are greatest. We explore a new dimension of this size-pay nexus by showing that marginal returns also differ across activities within firms and industries. Using hand-collected data on managers in European banks well below the level of executive directors, we find that the size-pay nexus is strongest for investment banking business units and for banks with a market-based business model. Thus, managerial compensation is most sensitive to size increases for activities that can easily be scaled up.

This paper documents that "zombie" lending by undercapitalized banks distorts competition and impedes corporate innovation. This misallocation of capital prevents both the exit of zombie and entry of healthy firms in affected industries adversely impacting output and competition. Worse, capital misallocation depresses patent applications, particularly in high technology- and R&D-intensive sectors, and industries with neck- and-neck competition. We strengthen our results using an IV approach to address reverse causality and innovation survey data from the European Commission. Overall, our results are consistent with externalities imposed on healthy firms through the misallocation of capital.

This paper provides evidence that banks cut lending to US borrowers as a consequence of a trade shock. This adverse reaction is stronger for banks with higher ex-ante lending to US industries hit by the trade shock. Importantly, I document large heterogeneity in banks‘ reaction depending on their sectoral specialisation. Banks shield industries in which they are specialised in and at the same time reduce the availability of credit to industries they are not specialised in. The latter is driven by low-capital banks and lending to firms that are themselves hit by the trade shock. Banks‘ adjustments have adverse real effects.

East German manufacturers’ revenue productivity (value-added per worker) is some 8 (25) percent below West German levels, even three decades after German unification. Using firm-product-level data containing information on product quantities and prices, we analyse the role of product specialisation and reject the prominent ‚extended work bench hypothesis‘, stating a specialisation of Eastern firms in the intermediate input production as explanation for these sustained productivity differences. We decompose the East’s revenue productivity disadvantage into Eastern firms selling at lower prices and producing more physical output for given amounts of inputs within ten-digit product industries. This suggests that Eastern firms specialise vertically in simpler product varieties generating less consumer value but being manufactured with less or cheaper inputs. Vertical specialisation, however, does not explain the productivity gap as Eastern firms are physically less productive for given product prices, implying a genuine physical productivity disadvantage of Eastern compared to Western firms

East German manufacturers’ revenue productivity (value-added per worker) is some 8 (25) percent below West German levels, even three decades after German unification. Using firm-product-level data containing information on product quantities and prices, we analyse the role of product specialisation and reject the prominent ‚extended work bench hypothesis‘, stating a specialisation of Eastern firms in the intermediate input production as explanation for these sustained productivity differences. We decompose the East’s revenue productivity disadvantage into Eastern firms selling at lower prices and producing more physical output for given amounts of inputs within ten-digit product industries. This suggests that Eastern firms specialise vertically in simpler product varieties generating less consumer value but being manufactured with less or cheaper inputs. Vertical specialisation, however, does not explain the productivity gap as Eastern firms are physically less productive for given product prices, implying a genuine physical productivity disadvantage of Eastern compared to Western firms.

Niedriglohnsektor und steigende Lohnungleichheit sind seit langem dominierende Themen am Arbeitsmarkt. Dieser Artikel legt nahe, dass die Verhandlungsmacht der Arbeitnehmer von der Existenz von Betriebsräten und Tarifverträgen abhängt und dass sich vor allem betriebliche Mitbestimmung positiv auf Löhne auswirkt. Während Mitbestimmung die zwischenbetriebliche Lohnungleichheit erhöht, wird sie durch Tarifverträge reduziert.

Was treibt regionale Entwicklung? Warum wachsen einige Regionen schneller als andere? Diese Fragen stehen im Mittelpunkt regionalökonomischer Forschung. Einen besonderen Anwendungsfall stellen die ökonomischen Anpassungsprozesse im Gefolge der Wiederherstellung der Deutschen Einheit dar. Nach einem fulminanten Start in der ersten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre hat sich der Aufholprozess seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre verlangsamt und kommt seitdem nur noch in sehr kleinen Schritten voran. Im Jahr 2017 betrug die Produktivität Ostdeutschlands (mit Berlin) 82% des westdeutschen Niveaus. Über die Ursachen dieses Rückstands gibt es intensive Diskussionen.

Die Transformation der Planwirtschaften Osteuropas in markwirtschaftliche Systeme, die Integration Ost- und Westeuropas und die deutsche Wiedervereinigung waren recht einmalige politische und gesellschaftliche Prozesse. Es gab keine „Evidenz“ aus früheren Zeiten, an denen sich die handelnden Akteure orientieren konnten. Zeigt dies die Grenzen evidenzbasierter Politik auf? Einer Politik, die Maßnahmen vorab evaluiert, deren Wirkungen beobachtet und aus diesen empirischen Beobachtungen systematisch Schlüsse für zukünftiges politisches Handeln zieht? In einem eng definierten Sinn evidenzbasierter Politik muss die Antwort auf diese Frage sicherlich „Ja“ lauten. Es gibt Grenzen evidenzbasierter Politik in Zeiten großer gesellschaftlicher Umwälzungen und wenn (wirtschafts-)politische Maßnahmen so weit aus dem Rahmen des bisher Bekannten heraustreten, dass Verhaltensmuster der Vergangenheit kaum Rückschlüsse auf zukünftiges Verhalten zulassen. In solchen Phasen sind alle sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen gefordert, politische Prozesse aus einem breiten Fundus an Wissen und Erfahrungen heraus zu begleiten. Empirisch messbare Effekte einzelner Maßnahmen sind in solchen Umbruchzeiten nicht verfügbar. So verstanden könnten Überlegungen zur Rolle evidenzbasierter Politik generell und speziell zur Frage, wie Finanzmärkte zur Transformation von wirtschaftlichen Systemen beitragen, schnell enden.