In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, wie Unternehmen ihre Organisation anpassen, wenn sie erstmalig an die Börse gehen (initial public offering, IPO). Im Zuge des Börsengangs wandeln sich Unternehmen in eine hierarchischere Organisation um und verstärken die Aufsicht durch das Management. Organisatorische Funktionen in den Bereichen Rechnungswesen, Finanzen, Informationstechnologie und Personalwesen gewinnen an Bedeutung. Sie tauschen einen großen Teil ihrer Belegschaft und fast ihr gesamtes Management aus, um ihr Humankapital an die neue Organisation anzupassen. Die neue Organisation erleichtert interne Versetzungen und Beförderungen. Insgesamt ist das Unternehmen durch den Börsengang einem Wandel unterworfen, der die Abhängigkeit des Unternehmens von einzelnen Beschäftigten verringert und den Produktionsprozess effizient organisiert.

This study investigates whether and how financial technologies (FinTech) influence the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. We use an interacted panel vector autoregression model to explore how the effects of monetary policy shocks change with regional-level FinTech adoption. Results indicate that FinTech adoption generally mitigates the transmission of monetary policy to real GDP, consumer prices, bank loans, and housing prices, with the most significant impact observed in the weakened transmission to bank loan growth. The relaxed financial constraints, regulatory arbitrage, and intensified competition are the possible mechanisms underlying the mitigated transmission.

This paper proposes to explain the productivity growth slowdown with the poaching of disruptive inventors by firms these inventors threaten with their research. I build an endogenous growth model with incremental and disruptive innovation and an inventor labor market where this defensive poaching takes place. Incremental firms poach more as they grow, which lowers the probability of disruption and makes large incremental firms even more prevalent. I perform an event study around disruptive innovations to confirm the main features of the model: Disruptions increase future research productivity, hurt incumbent inventors and raise the probability of future disruption. Without disruption, technology classes slowly trend even further towards incrementalism. I calibrate the model to the global patent landscape in 1990 and show that the model predicts 52% of the decline of disruptive innovation until 2010.

Deutschland steht mitten in einem radikalen Umbruch. Neue Fundamente für nachhaltigen Wohlstand und sozialen Frieden zu schaffen, wird uns große Anstrengungen abverlangen. Egal ob Bildung, Technologie oder Wirtschaft: Wir können die epochalen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit nur bewältigen, wenn wir gemeinsam, offen und ehrlich bestimmen, wie wir uns eine gute Zukunft für Deutschland vorstellen – und was wir zu investieren bereit sind. Wer wollen wir in einer Welt von morgen sein? Wofür soll Deutschland in Zukunft stehen?

We study changes in job reallocation in Europe after 2000 using novel microaggregated data that we collected for 19 European countries. In all countries, we document broad-based declines in job reallocation rates that concern most economic sectors and size classes. These declines are mainly driven by dynamics within sectors, size, and age classes rather than by compositional changes. Simultaneously, employment shares of young firms decline. Consistent with US evidence, firms’ employment has become less responsive to productivity shocks. However, the dispersion of firms’ productivity shocks has decreased too. To enhance our understanding of these patterns, we derive and apply a firm-level framework that relates changes in firms’ market power, labor market imperfections, and production technology to firms’ responsiveness and job reallocation. Using German firm-level data, we find that changes in markups and labor output elasticities, rather than adjustment costs, are key in rationalizing declining responsiveness.

We study changes in business dynamism in Europe after 2000 using novel micro-aggregated data that we collected for 19 European countries. In all countries, we document a broad-based decline in job reallocation rates that concerns most economic sectors and size classes. This decline is mainly driven by dynamics within sectors, size, and age classes rather than by compositional changes. Large and mature firms experience the strongest decline in job reallocation rates. Simultaneously, the employment shares of young firms decline. Consistent with US evidence, firms’ employment has become less responsive to productivity shocks. However, the dispersion of firms’ productivity shocks has decreased too. To enhance our understanding of these patterns, we derive and apply a novel firm-level framework that relates changes in firms’ sales, market power, wages, and production technology to firms’ responsiveness and job reallocation.