Unternehmerische Aktivität ist ein dynamischer Treiber wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung. Finanzmarktwissen befähigt Individuen zu einer besseren Abwägung von Chancen und Risiken. In diesem Beitrag wird geprüft, ob ein höheres Maß an Finanzmarktwissen auch einen Einfluss auf die Entscheidung hat, sich selbstständig zu machen. Dieser Zusammenhang wird auf der Basis von Umfragedaten für Deutschland empirisch bestätigt.

The pace of business dynamism and entrepreneurship in the U.S. has declined over recent decades. We show that the character of that decline changed around 2000. Since 2000 the decline in dynamism and entrepreneurship has been accompanied by a decline in high-growth young firms. Prior research has shown that the sustained contribution of business startups to job creation stems from a relatively small fraction of high-growth young firms. The presence of these high-growth young firms contributes to a highly (positively) skewed firm growth rate distribution. In 1999, a firm at the 90th percentile of the employment growth rate distribution grew about 31 percent faster than the median firm. Moreover, the 90−50 differential was 16 percent larger than the 50−10 differential reflecting the positive skewness of the employment growth rate distribution. We show that the shape of the firm employment growth distribution changes substantially in the post-2000 period. By 2007, the 90−50 differential was only 4 percent larger than the 50−10, and it continued to exhibit a trend decline through 2011. The overall decline reflects a sharp drop in the 90th percentile of the growth rate distribution accounted for by the declining share of young firms and the declining propensity for young firms to be high-growth firms.

We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.

A growing body of evidence indicates that the U.S. economy has become less dynamic in recent years. This trend is evident in declining rates of gross job and worker flows as well as declining rates of entrepreneurship and young firm activity, and the trend is pervasive across industries, regions, and firm size classes. We describe the evidence on these changes in the U.S. economy by reviewing existing research. We then describe new empirical facts about the relationship between establishment-level productivity and employment growth, framing our results in terms of canonical models of firm dynamics and suggesting empirically testable potential explanations.

Unter dem Titel „Von der Transformation zur europäischen Integration: Auf dem Weg zu mehr Wachstumsdynamik“ hat das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) gemeinsam mit Partnern aus Universitäten in Mitteldeutschland am 22. Februar 2016 Forschungsergebnisse zu den Folgen des Strukturwandels, zur Erzielung von mehr Wachstums­dynamik und den wirtschaftspolitischen Rahmenbedingungen hierfür präsentiert.

Die amtliche Statistik hat die Angaben zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt der ostdeutschen Flächenländer für die Jahre seit 2000 um jährlich rund 3% erhöht. In dieser Korrektur kommen auch konzeptionelle Erweiterungen des gesamtwirtschaftlichen Rechnungswesens zum Tragen. Insbesondere betrifft das Forschungs- und Entwicklungsleistungen, die jetzt wie eine Investition in ein Vermögensgut behandelt werden. Es zeigt sich, dass der Osten in diesem Zukunftsbereich gegenüber dem Westen stärker zurückliegt, als bisher beziffert worden ist.

An optimal pace of business dynamics—encompassing the processes of entry, exit, expansion, and contraction—would balance the benefits of productivity and economic growth against the costs to firms and workers associated with reallocation of productive resources. It is difficult to prescribe what the optimal pace should be, but evidence accumulating from multiple datasets and methodologies suggests that the rate of business startups and the pace of employment dynamism in the US economy has fallen over recent decades and that this downward trend accelerated after 2000. A critical factor in accounting for the decline in business dynamics is a lower rate of business startups and the related decreasing role of dynamic young businesses in the economy. For example, the share of US employment accounted for by young firms has declined by almost 30 percent over the last 30 years. These trends suggest that incentives for entrepreneurs to start new firms in the United States have diminished over time. We do not identify all the factors underlying these trends in this paper but offer some clues based on the empirical patterns for specific sectors and geographic regions.

The majority of empirical studies make use of the assumption of stable preferences in searching for a relationship between risk attitude and the decision to become and stay an entrepreneur. Yet empirical evidence on this relationship is limited. In this paper, we show that entry into entrepreneurship itself plays a decisive role in shaping risk preferences. We find that becoming self-employed is indeed associated with a relative increase in risk attitudes, an increase that is quantitatively large and significant even after controlling for individual characteristics, different employment status, and duration of entrepreneurship. The findings suggest that studies assuming that risk attitudes are stable over time suffer from reverse causality; risk attitudes do not remain stable over time, and individual preferences change endogenously.

Business incubator initiatives are a widespread policy instrument for the promotion of entrepreneurship, innovation and the development of new technology-based firms. Recently, there has been an increasing tendency for the more traditional diversified incubators to be superseded by incubators focusing their support elements, processes and selection criteria on firms from one specific sector, and its particular needs. Despite the increasing importance of such specialized incubators in regional innovation strategies, the question of whether they are advantageous has neither been investigated empirically nor discussed theoretically in detail. Drawing on large-scale survey data from 161 firms incubated in either diversified or specialized incubators in Germany, we investigate the benefits to firms of being part of a specialized business incubator as opposed to being part of a generalized business incubator. The investigation of the value-added contribution of specialized incubators, in particular regarding hardware components, business assistance, networking and reputation gains, reveals considerable differences compared to the more diversified incubation model.

Within incubator-incubation research, there is a predominant focus on incubator organizations located in industrialized or developed economies. Knowledge regarding the evolution of incubators located in transition economies is almost non-existent. However, meanwhile a significant number of incubators have been established since the fall of the iron curtain in many Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as well. Here, the present paper sets in through providing evidence on the development, distribution and structural characteristics of incubators in six selected CEE countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia). We show that incubator organizations have become a central element of support infrastructure for SME and entrepreneurship in CEE countries during the past 20 years. We further argue that by drawing upon the accumulated experience with incubators in developed Western (European) economies, there are important lessons to be learned for incubator stakeholders in transition economies. We, therefore, outline particular suggestions considered to be vital for long-term successful incubation processes in transition economies.