The continued expansionary policy of the Federal Reserve gives rise to speculation whether the Fed will be able to maintain price stability in the coming decades. Most of the scientific work relating money to prices relies on broad monetary aggregates (i.e. M2 for the United States). In our paper, we argue that this view falls short. The historically unique monetary expansion has not yet fully reached M2. Using a cointegration approach, we aim to show the hidden risks for the future development of M2 and correspondingly prices. In a simulation analysis we show that even if the multiplier remains substantially below its pre-crisis level, M2 will exceed its current growth path with a probability of 95%.

Die institutionelle Konvergenz wird seit der Gründung der Europäischen Union als Voraussetzung für die wirtschaftliche Konvergenz angesehen. In den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern wurde eine institutionelle Konvergenz de jure bzw. eine Harmonisierung ex ante durch die Verpflichtung der EU-Beitrittskandidaten zur Übernahme des Acquis Communautaire angestrebt. Die institutionelle Angleichung der neuen Mitgliedstaaten an die EU-Normen sollte die Grundlage für ein schnelleres Wachstum (und damit für die wirtschaftliche Konvergenz in der EU) legen. In diesem Beitrag wird unter Verwendung der „Transition Indicators“ der Europäischen Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (EBRD) mit Hilfe einer Clusteranalyse das Vorhandensein einer institutionellen Konvergenz de facto in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern analysiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine tatsächliche institutionelle Annäherung nur bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre stattgefunden hat. Seitdem ist in den neuen Mitgliedstaaten eine Tendenz zur Stagnation bzw. Divergenz der institutionellen Entwicklung zu verzeichnen. Die untersuchten Länder scheinen in ihren regionalen Clubs (Clustern) „festzustecken“, statt sich de facto weiter an die EU-Normen anzugleichen.

During 2013, the world economy has recovered from a soft spot that had started in summer 2012, and chances are good that the speed of expansion in world production observed in the second half of 2013 will be kept up in 2014. Growth of world trade, however, is markedly lower than it should be if correlations of the past 20 years were still valid. The uncertain prospects for trade are a serious risk factor, in particular for export oriented economies, in 2014 and beyond.

Schumpeterian growth theory has operationalized Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction by developing models based on this concept. These models shed light on several aspects of the growth process that could not be properly addressed by alternative theories. In this survey, we focus on four important aspects, namely: (i) the role of competition and market structure; (ii) firm dynamics; (iii) the relationship between growth and development with the notion of appropriate growth institutions; and (iv) the emergence and impact of long-term technological waves. In each case, Schumpeterian growth theory delivers predictions that distinguish it from other growth models and which can be tested using micro data.

We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also influence concentration in banking and thus the impact of bank-specific shocks for the aggregate economy. To test these relationships, we use different measures of de jure and de facto financial openness in a linked micro-macro panel dataset. Our research has three main findings: First, bank-level shocks significantly impact on GDP. Second, financial openness lowers GDP growth. Third, granular effects tend to be stronger in financially closed economies.

Für die deutsche Wirtschaft stehen die Zeichen auf Erholung. Das reale Bruttoinlandsprodukt zog nach einem Rückgang im vergangenen Winterhalbjahr im Sommer 2013 wieder an. Das preisbereinigte Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte im Jahr 2013 um 0,6% und im Jahr 2014 um 2% zulegen. Während die Arbeitslosenquote im Jahr 2014 zurückgeht, wird sich die Verbraucherpreisinflation etwas beschleunigen.

In autumn 2013, the expansion of world output has slightly accelerated. The recovery in the euro area is partly a result of special effects such as a rebound of construction after a particularly cold winter. Other positive factors, however, are longer lasting. Above all, doubts about the future of the currency union have receded substantially. As a consequence, private households and firms are more prepared to take spending decisions. For these reasons, we have revised upward our GDP forecasts for 2013, to -0.3 per cent lower in 2013 than in 2012 (from -0.5 expected in the summer).

For 2014, we expect a GDP growth of about 1.0% that will keep unemployment at similar levels to the ones observed in 2013 (12.3%). Our inflation expectations for 2013 have moderated to a y-o-y rate of 1.5%, and they remain subdued also in 2014, at about 1.4%.

We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also influence concentration in banking and thus the impact of bank-specific shocks for the aggregate economy. To test these relationships, we use different measures of de jure and de facto financial openness in a linked micro-macro panel dataset. Our research has three main findings: First, bank-level shocks significantly impact on GDP. Second, financial openness lowers GDP growth. Third, granular effects tend to be stronger in financially closed economies.

After German reunification, interregional subsidies accounted for approximately 4% of gross fixed capital investment in the new federal states (i.e. those which were formerly part of the German Democratic Republic). We show that, between 1992 and 2005, infrastructure and corporate investment subsidies had a negative net impact on regional economic growth and convergence. This result is robust to both the specification of spatially weighted control variables and the use of instrumental variable techniques to control for the endogeneity of subsidies. Our results suggest that regional redistribution was ineffective, potentially due to a lack of spatial concentration to create growth poles.