Banks play a special role in the financial system. According to classical banking theory, they help reduce informational asymmetries and serve as liquidity providers. Banks can, at least partially, lower transaction costs that result from information frictions between investors and firms and thereby alleviate firms’ funding constraints (Diamond, 1984). Moreover, banks create liquidity on their balance sheets by financing comparably illiquid assets with relatively liquid liabilities (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Integrating credit and liquidity provision functions, banks have been the object of numerous studies on financial intermediation. A particular focus in recent years has been on banks’ behavior as well as on the con- sequences of their actions for the real economy when hit by adverse shocks. Following the global financial crisis, financial shocks that originate from within the financial sec- tor have received wide attention (Cingano et al., 2016; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Paravisini, 2008; Paravisini et al., 2015; Schnabl, 2012). However, banks are also subject to numerous non-financial shocks, which are the focus of this thesis.

We analyze the effects of a reform of capital regulation for U.S. insurance companies in 2009. The reform eliminates capital buffers against unexpected losses associated with portfolio holdings of MBS, but not for other fixed-income assets. After the reform, insurance companies are much more likely to retain downgraded MBS compared to other downgraded assets. This pattern is more pronounced for financially constrained insurers. Exploiting discontinuities in the reform’s implementation, we can identify the relevance of the capital requirements channel. We also document that the insurance industry crowds outs other investors in the new issuance of (high-yield) MBS.

Capital inflow surges destabilize the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.

We observe that public firms are more likely to issue seasoned stocks rather than bonds when theirs boards are more socially-connected. These connected issuers experience better announcement-period stock returns and attract more institutional investors. This social-connection effect is stronger for firms with severe information asymmetry, higher risk of being undersubscribed, and more visible to investors. Our conjecture is this social-network effect is driven by trust in issuing firms. Given stocks are more sensitive to trust, these trusted firms are more likely to issue stocks than bonds. Trustworthiness plays an important role in firms’ security issuances in capital markets.

This paper offers a novel framework, combining firm operational risk, IPO pricing risk, and market risk, to model IPO failure risk. By analyzing nearly a thousand variables, we observe that prior IPO failure risk models have suffered from a major missing-variable problem. Evidence reveals several key new firm-level determinants, e.g., the volatility operating performance, the size of its accounts payable, pretax income to common equity, total short-term debt, and a few macroeconomic variables such as treasury bill rate, and book-to-market of the DJIA index. These findings have major economic implications. The total value loss from not predicting the imminent failure of an IPO is significantly lower with this proposed model compared to other established models. The IPO investors could have saved around $18billion over the period between 1994 and 2016 by using this model.

This paper uses novel news ticker data to evaluate the effect of sovereign risk on economic and financial outcomes. The use of intraday news enables me to derive policy events and respective timestamps that potentially alter investors’ beliefs about a sovereign’s willingness to service its debt and thereby sovereign risk. Following the high frequency identification literature, in the tradition of Kuttner (2001) and Guerkaynak et al. (2005), associated variation in sovereign risk is then obtained by capturing bond price movements within narrowly defined time windows around the event time. I conduct the outlined identification for Italy since its large bond market and its frequent coverage in the news render it a suitable candidate country. Using the identified shocks in an instrumental variable local projection setting yields a strong instrument and robust results in line with theoretical predictions. I document a dampening effect of sovereign risk on output. Also, borrowing costs for the private sector increase and inflation rises in response to higher sovereign risk.

We examine whether household income influences the trading styles of retail investors and their investment performance. To investigate this question, we use a unique dataset of branch-level trading that contains all retail investors and observe that those investors with high income trade more and earn significantly higher returns in the stock market. In addition, this income effect becomes stronger for highly risky stocks, such as gambling or lottery-like stocks. These findings are in line with the information model theorized by Peress (2004) in which wealthy investors take extra risks by trading more stocks.

We find that foreign institutional investors (FIIs) reduce their investee firms’ tax avoidance. We provide evidence that the effect is driven by the institutional distance between FIIs’ home countries/regions and host countries/regions. Specifically, we find that the effect is driven by the influence of FIIs from countries/regions with high-quality institutions (i.e., common law, high government effectiveness, and high regulatory quality) on investee firms located in countries/regions with low-quality institutions. Furthermore, we show that the effect is concentrated on FIIs with little experience in the investee countries/regions or FIIs with stronger monitoring incentives. Finally, we find that FIIs are more likely to vote against management if the firm has a higher level of tax avoidance.

This paper investigates whether state-to-state political ties with the United States affect the pricing of global syndicated loans. We find that a one-standard-deviation improvement in state political ties between the U.S. and the government of a borrower’s home country is associated with a 14.7 basis points lower loan spread, shaving off about 11.8 million USD in interest payments over the duration of the average loan for borrowers. Results also show that the effect of political ties is stronger for narrower and more concentrated loan syndicates, when lead arrangers are U.S. banks, during periods in which the U.S. is engaged in armed conflicts, when the U.S. president belongs to the Republican Party, and for borrowers with better balance sheets and prior lending relationships. Notably, not all firms benefit equally, as cross-listed firms and firms in countries with strong institutional quality and ability to attract institutional investors are much less affected by political ties.

This paper examines the effect of CoCo bonds that qualify as additional tier 1 capital on bank stability and reporting. The results reveal a significant reduction in the distance to insolvency following the hybrid bond issuance due to increased earnings volatility. Banks report less stable net income due to more volatile loss provisions, which increases earnings opacity rather than reflects changes in asset quality. The findings are consistent with the premise that persistent uncertainty and misconceptions among investors about bail-in likelihoods limit their monitoring engagement, which results in banks becoming less transparent.