We examine the determinants of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) focusing on institutional and social factors. Using panel data on 59 countries from 1995 to 2008, we find that host countries with free and open markets and greater cultural distance from Japan attract Japanese FDI. Good institutions, such as a well-developed legal framework and an effective government, are important in promoting Japanese FDI to emerging economies, whereas fewer regulatory restrictions, lower tax burden, and more religious diversity attract Japanese FDI to developed countries. We find that corruption stimulates Japanese FDI to developed countries, which is contrary to most previous research.

In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced new ratings for banks that account for the potential of government support. The rating changes are not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks’ credit fundamentals. We use this natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of bail out expectations for bank behavior using a difference in differences approach. The results suggest a striking difference between the effects of bail out probabilities during calm times (“ex ante”) versus during crisis times (“ex post”). During calm times, higher bail-out probabilities result in higher risk taking, consistent with the moral hazard view and much of the empirical literature. However, in crisis times, we find that banks with higher bail out probabilities tend to increase their risk taking less compared to banks that were ex ante unlikely to be bailed-out. Charter values are one part of the explanation: Supported banks may have a funding advantage relative to non-supported banks during the crisis. However, we cannot rule out that other factors also may be playing a role, including tighter supervision of supported banks in crisis times.

Ein optimal ausgestalteter Steuervollzug sollte die gesamtwirtschaftliche Effizienz des Steuersystems sicherstellen. In einem föderalen Staat stellt sich daher auch die Frage, in welchem Verantwortungsbereich die Finanzverwaltung angesiedelt sein sollte, um dieser Funktion möglichst gerecht zu werden. Es wird verdeutlicht, dass es im deutschen Finanzföderalismus unter Berücksichtigung des gegenwärtig geltenden Finanzausgleichsgesetzes einen eindeutigen komparativen Vorteil weder für eine Finanzverwaltung in Verantwortung des Bundes noch für eine solche in Verantwortung der Länder gibt.

Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data for the period 1996 to 2006, we find that household demand for real estate is relatively high if the marginal investment in home equity is covered by the exemption. The home equity bias is more pronounced for younger households that face more financial uncertainty and therefore have a higher ex ante probability of bankruptcy.

This article empirically investigates the competitive effects of government bail-out policies. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks' risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.

I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.

The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.

There is a widespread concern that increased trade may lead to increased instability and thus risk at the firm level. Greater export openness can indeed affect firm-level volatility by changing the exposure and the reaction of firms to macroeconomic developments. The net effect is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. This paper provides firm-level evidence on the link between openness and volatility. Using comprehensive data on more than 21,000 German manufacturing firms for the period 1980–2001, we analyse the evolution of firm-level output volatility and the link between volatility and export openness. Our paper has three main findings. First, firm-level output volatility is significantly higher than the level of aggregate volatility, but it displays similar patterns. Second, increased export openness lowers firm-level output volatility. This effect is primarily driven by variations along the extensive margin, i.e. by the distinction between exporters and non-exporters. Variations along the intensive margin, i.e. the volume of exports, tend to have a dampening impact on volatility as well. Third, small firms are more volatile than large firms.

This study looks at the determinants of entry by Turkish banks into local markets during the periods before and after the crisis of 2000–2001. Motivated by a theoretical model of entry, results of fixed-effects logit regressions suggest that there has been a change in the geographical diversification strategies of Turkish banks. It appears that the dominance of strategic concerns, such as competing with banks of similar size, has diminished, while economic concerns, such as incumbent characteristics and cost considerations, have become more important. Overall, the postcrisis restructuring policies seem to have led to improved decision making in the sector.

This study examines the relationship between post-crisis bank consolidation and the number of bank branches in Turkey. Using a unique data set, the analysis addresses several issues related to the impact of market characteristics on branching behavior. The findings suggest that sales of failed institutions by the central authority lead to branch closures in small and uncompetitive markets where the buyer does not have a prior presence. Contrary to popular belief, mergers between healthy institutions do not always cause a decrease in the number of branches; rather, they are shown to increase the availability of banking services in concentrated markets.