Prognosemodelle für die zukünftige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung verwenden häufig marktbasierte Indikatoren wie Spreads von Unternehmensanleihen, die den Risikoaufschlag gegenüber einem Referenzzins angeben. Anleihespreads bilden jedoch nur die Entwicklung von Risiken für Unternehmen ab, die regelmäßig Anleihen emittieren – im Durchschnitt größere, sichere Firmen. Neuartige Daten zu Bankkrediten, die im Sekundärmarkt gehandelt werden, erlauben auch die Konstruktion von Kreditspreads. Kreditmarktdaten umfassen ein breiteres Spektrum an Firmen, inklusive kleinerer Firmen, die stärker von Finanzmarktfriktionen betroffen sind. Tests zeigen, dass Kreditspreads tatsächlich mehr Informationen über wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen beinhalten als Anleihespreads und daher das Potenzial haben, Prognosemodelle zu verbessern.

We develop a SIR-based macroeconomic model to study the impact of testing/ quarantining and social distancing/mask use on health and economic outcomes. These policies can dramatically reduce the costs of an epidemic. Absent testing/quarantining, the main effect of social distancing and mask use on health outcomes is to delay, rather than reduce, epidemic-related deaths. Social distancing and mask use reduce the severity of the epidemic-related recession but prolong its duration. There is an important synergy between social distancing and mask use and testing/quarantining. Social distancing and mask use buy time for testing and quarantining to come to the rescue. The benefits of testing/quarantining are even larger when people can get reinfected, either because the virus mutates or immunity is temporary.

The Covid epidemic had a large impact on economic activity. In contrast, the dramatic decline in mortality from infectious diseases over the past 120 years had a small economic impact. We argue that people's response to successive Covid waves helps reconcile these two findings. Our analysis uses a unique administrative data set with anonymized monthly expenditures at the individual level that covers the first three Covid waves. Consumer expenditures fell by about the same amount in the first and third waves, even though the risk of getting infected was larger in the third wave. We find that people had pessimistic prior beliefs about the case-fatality rates that converged over time to the true case-fatality rates. Using a model where Covid is endemic, we show that the impact of Covid is small when people know the true case-fatality rate but large when people have empirically-plausible pessimistic prior beliefs about the case-fatality rate. These results reconcile the large economic impact of Covid with the small effect of the secular decline in mortality from infectious diseases estimated in the literature.

We argue that the COVID epidemic disproportionately affected the economic well-being and health of poor people. To disentangle the forces that generated this outcome, we construct a model that is consistent with the heterogeneous impact of the COVID recession on low- and high-income people. According to our model, two-thirds of the inequality in COVID deaths reflect preexisting inequality in comorbidity rates and access to quality health care. The remaining third stems from the fact that low-income people work in occupations where the risk of infection is high. Our model also implies that the rise in income inequality generated by the COVID epidemic reflects the nature of the goods that low-income people produce. Finally, we assess the health-income trade-offs associated with fiscal transfers to the poor and mandatory containment policies.

By adopting a difference-in-differences specification combined with propensity score matching, I provide evidence using the microdata of German banks that stateowned savings banks have lent less than credit cooperatives during the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, the weaker lending effects of state-owned banks are pronounced for long-term and nonrevolving loans but insignificant for short-term and revolving loans. Moreover, the negative impact of government ownership is larger for borrowers who are more exposed to the COVID-19 shock and in regions where the ruling parties are longer in office and more positioned on the right side of the political spectrum.

We study whether government subsidies can stimulate bank funding of marginal investment projects and the associated effect on financial stability. We do so by exploiting granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development programme in Germany since 1997: the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures programme (GRW). By combining the universe of subsidised firms to virtually all German local banks over the period 1998-2019, we test whether this large-scale transfer programme destabilised regional credit markets. Because GRW subsidies to firms are destabilised at the EU level, we can use it as an exogenous shock to identify bank responses. On average, firm subsidies do not affect bank lending, but reduce banks’ distance to default. Average effects conflate important bank-level heterogeneity though. Conditional on various bank traits, we show that well capitalised banks with more industry experience expand lending when being exposed to subsidised firms without exhibiting more risky financial profiles. Our results thus indicate that stable banks can act as an important facilitator of regional economic development policies. Against the backdrop of pervasive transfer payments to mitigate Covid-19 losses and in light of far-reaching transformation policies required to green the economy, our study bears important implications as to whether and which banks to incorporate into the design of transfer Programmes.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the introduction of mandatory face mask usage triggered a heated debate. A major point of controversy is whether community use of masks creates a false sense of security that would diminish physical distancing, counteracting any potential direct benefit from masking. We conducted a randomized field experiment in Berlin, Germany, to investigate how masks affect distancing and whether the mask effect interacts with the introduction of an indoor mask mandate. Joining waiting lines in front of stores, we measured distances kept from the experimenter in two treatment conditions – the experimenter wore a mask in one and no face covering in the other – in two time spans – before and after mask use becoming mandatory in stores. We find no evidence that mandatory masking has a negative effect on distance kept toward a masked person. To the contrary, masks significantly increase distancing and the effect does not differ between the two periods. However, we show that after the mandate distances are shorter in locations where more non-essential stores, which were closed before the mandate, had reopened. We argue that the relaxations in general restrictions that coincided with the mask mandate led individuals to reduce other precautions, like keeping a safe distance.

Die Bundesregierung plant, mit dem Zweiten Nachtragshaushalt 2021 dem Energie- und Klimafonds eine Rücklage in Höhe von 60 Mrd. Euro zuzuführen. Die Mittel sollen in den Folgejahren in Investitionen in den Klimaschutz und die Transformation der Wirtschaft fließen und zugleich gesamtwirtschaftliche Folgekosten der Pandemie verringern. Diese pandemiebedingten Einbußen sind auch in der mittleren Frist erheblich. Zwar dürften Nachholeffekte beim privaten Konsum die im Jahr 2021 noch deutliche Unterauslastung bis zum Jahr 2024 vollständig verschwinden lassen. Jedoch liegt das Produktionspotenzial in den kommenden Jahren mehr als 1,5% unter dem Ende 2019 vom IWH prognostizierten Wert, vor allem wegen eines geringeren Arbeitsangebots, unter anderem aufgrund deutlich niedrigerer Zuwanderung von Arbeitskräften. Die Investitionen sind gemäß aktueller Mittelfristprojektion im Jahr 2024 ebenfalls noch deutlich niedriger. Die Effekte des Nachtragshaushalts auf Investitionstätigkeit und Produktion lassen sich mit Hilfe des finanzpolitischen Simulationsmodells des IWH abschätzen. Die beabsichtigten Mehrausgaben dürften auf dem Höhepunkt ihrer Wirksamkeit im Jahr 2024 die gesamtwirtschaftliche Aktivität um etwa 0,5% steigern. Allerdings werden die zusätzlichen Investitionen die seit Pandemiebeginn ausgebliebene Investitionstätigkeit bei Weitem nicht kompensieren können. Eine Bewertung des Nachtragshaushals hat die positiven gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effekte zusätzlicher Investitionen und die negativen Effekte auf die Glaubwürdigkeit der Schuldenbremse gegeneinander abzuwägen.

Ende 2021 belastet eine neue Infektionswelle die wirtschaftliche Aktivität in Europa. Die Stimmung im Dienstleistungsbereich ist im Herbst weltweit gestiegen, doch das Verarbeitende Gewerbe leidet weiter überall unter Knappheiten. Im Sommerhalbjahr 2022 gewinnt die Weltkonjunktur wieder etwas an Schwung, aber der ungewisse Fortgang der Pandemie bleibt ein Risiko. Pandemiewelle und Lieferengpässe lassen auch die deutsche Wirtschaft im Winter stagnieren. Der private Konsum wird ab Frühjahr deutlich zulegen, und die Konjunktur wird wieder kräftig in Schwung kommen. Das BIP wird 2022 um 3,5% zunehmen, nach 2,7% im Jahr 2021. Die Inflation dürfte nur langsam zurückgehen.