We study the aggregate, distributional, and welfare effects of fiscal policy responses to Germany’s energy crisis arising in 2022 using a novel ten-agent New Keynesian (TENK) model. The crisis, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, led to sharp price increases and significant consumption disparities. Our model, calibrated to Germany’s income and consumption distribution, evaluates key policy interventions. We find that non-targeted transfers had the largest short-term aggregate impact, while targeted transfers for lower income households were more cost-effective. The energy cost brake and reductions in gas and oil taxes have shown very little effect, but were comparatively cost-effective under the assumption of exogenous prices. Our results highlight how targeted fiscal measures can address distributional effects and stabilize consumption during crises.

Am 12. November 2024 hörte das Bundesverfassungsgericht Argumente zu einer Klage einiger FDP-Abgeordneter gegen den Solidaritätszuschlag. IWH-Präsident Reint Gropp war als Sachverständiger geladen und gibt in diesem Beitrag seine Einschätzung zur Thematik wieder.

Wir untersuchen die kurz- und langfristigen Auswirkungen eines starken Anstiegs chinesischer Importe auf Wahlergebnisse in Europa. Populistische sowie links- und rechtsextreme Parteien gewannen erst viele Jahre nach dem Höhepunkt des China-Schocks bedeutenden Zuwachs an Wählerstimmen. Wir zeigen, dass die Auswirkungen von Importschocks überwiegend zugunsten populistischer Parteien ausfallen. In geringerem Maße profitieren in der kurzen Frist zudem linksextreme Parteien, langfristig hingegen rechtsextreme Parteien. Die Effekte auf das Wahlverhalten sind jedoch moderat und wir schlussfolgern, dass Importschocks den Aufstieg der politischen Ränder nur in begrenztem Maße erklären können.

This paper analyzes the distribution and composition of pre-tax national income in Germany since 1992, combining personal income tax returns, household survey data, and national accounts. Inequality rose from the 1990s to the late 2000s due to falling labor incomes among the bottom 50% and rising incomes in the top 10%. This trend reversed after 2007 as labor incomes across the bottom 90% increased. The top 1% income share, dominated by business income, remained relatively stable between 1992 and 2019. A large share of Germany’s top 1% earners are non-corporate business owners in labor-intensive professions. At least half of the business owners in P99-99.9 and a quarter in the top 0.1% operate firms in professional services – a pattern mirroring the United States. From 1992 to 2019, Germany’s top 0.1% income concentration exceeded France’s and matched U.S. levels until the late 2000s.