This paper investigates the impact of manager-investor interaction quality on stock returns by utilizing an online IPO roadshow dataset and leveraging a word-embedding model. We find that such interactions are positively valued, as reflected in initial returns. The effect is particularly pronounced for firms characterized by higher levels of information asymmetry, greater investor attention, increased question uncertainty, or discussions on topics not covered in prospectus. Additionally, our research reveals that effective management communication leads to increased first-day turnover rates and thus higher returns. These heightened returns persist up to 180 days following the IPO, without displaying a significant long-term reversal associated with interaction quality. These findings underscore the meaningful impact of the quality of manager-investor interactions on firm valuation.

Das Mannheimer Unternehmenspanel verknüpft mit dem Betriebs-Historik-Panel (MUP-BHP) setzt sich aus Querschnittsdatensätzen ab dem Jahr 2010 zusammen. Jeder Querschnitt umfasst alle Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) aus dem Mannheimer Unternehmenspanel (MUP) und deren Betriebsstätten des gesamtdeutschen Raumes, die in der Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH) zum Stichtag 31.12. erfasst sind. Diese Verknüpfung von Unternehmen und Betrieben liegt ein Record-Linkage der Adressdaten des vom Leibniz Institut für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung gehaltenen MUP und der Betriebsadressdaten am IAB zugrunde. Die einzelnen Querschnittsdatensätze enthalten Informationen zu den Betrieben und Unternehmen sowie eine Zusatzdatei zu Gesellschaftern. Die Datensätze können zu einem Panel verbunden werden. Dieser Datenreport beschreibt das Mannheimer Unternehmenspanel verknüpft mit dem Betriebs-Historik-Panel (MUP-BHP) 2010–2020.

This paper surveys recent advances in drawing structural conclusions from vector autoregressions (VARs), providing a unified perspective on the role of prior knowledge. We describe the traditional approach to identification as a claim to have exact prior information about the structural model and propose Bayesian inference as a way to acknowledge that prior information is imperfect or subject to error. We raise concerns from both a frequentist and a Bayesian perspective about the way that results are typically reported for VARs that are set-identified using sign and other restrictions. We call attention to a common but previously unrecognized error in estimating structural elasticities and show how to correctly estimate elasticities even in the case when one only knows the effects of a single structural shock.

Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.

We study how connections to German federal parliamentarians affect firm dynamics by constructing a novel dataset linking politicians and election candidates to the universe of firms. To identify the causal effect of access to political power, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Our results reveal that connections lead to reductions in firm exits, gradual increases in employment growth without improvements in productivity. Adding information on credit ratings, subsidies and procurement contracts allows us to distinguish between mechanisms driving the effects over the politician’s career.