This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.

This article derives a European Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity towards large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from reallocation accounted for 50% of European productivity growth and markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.

This article derives a European Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity towards large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from reallocation accounted for 50% of European productivity growth and markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.

A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long.

This article examines how trade shocks shape labour market imperfections that create market power in labour markets and prevent an efficient allocation of labour. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of those distortions in Germany’s manufacturing sector. Import competition can only exert labor market disciplining effects when firms rather than workers have labour market power. Otherwise, export demand and import competition shocks tend to fortify existing distortions by amplifying labour market power structures. This diminishes the gains from trade compared to a model with perfectly competitive labour markets.

This article examines how trade shocks shape labour market imperfections that create market power in labour markets and prevent an efficient allocation of labour. I develop a framework for measuring such labour market distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of those distortions in Germany’s manufacturing sector. Import competition can only exert labour market disciplining effects when firms rather than workers have labour market power. Otherwise, export demand and import competition shocks tend to fortify existing distortions by amplifying labour market power structures. This diminishes the gains from trade compared to a model with perfectly competitive labour markets.

A large literature documents declining measures of business dynamism including high-growth young firm activity and job reallocation. A distinct literature describes a slowdown in the pace of aggregate labor productivity growth. We relate these patterns by studying changes in productivity growth from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s using firm-level data. We find that diminished allocative efficiency gains can account for the productivity slowdown in a manner that interacts with the within-firm productivity growth distribution. The evidence suggests that the decline in dynamism is reason for concern and sheds light on debates about the causes of slowing productivity growth.

In dieser Kurzprognose wird das Frühjahrsgutachten 2013 vom 18. April 2013 vorgestellt. Die Konjunktur in Deutschland ist im Frühjahr 2013 wieder aufwärts gerichtet. Die Lage an den Finanzmärkten hat sich ent-spannt, nachdem die Unsicherheit über die Zukunft der Europäischen Währungsunion gesunken ist. Auch der weltwirtschaftliche Gegenwind hat nachgelassen. Die Institute erwarten, dass in Deutschland das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in diesem Jahr um 0,8% (68%-Prognoseintervall: 0,1% bis 1,5%) und im kommenden Jahr um 1,9% zunimmt. Die Zahl der Arbeitslosen dürfte weiter zurückgehen und im Jahresdurchschnitt bei 2,9 Millionen in diesem bzw. 2,7 Millionen Personen im nächsten Jahr liegen. Die Inflationsrate wird im laufenden Jahr auf 1,7% zurückgehen, bevor sie bei zunehmender Kapazitätsauslastung im kommenden Jahr auf 2,0% anzieht. Der Staatshaushalt wird im Jahr 2013 annähernd ausgeglichen sein und im Jahr 2014 dank der günstigeren Konjunktur einen Überschuss von 0,5% in Relation zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt aufweisen. Die Wirtschaftspolitik sollte jetzt die lange Frist wieder stärker in den Blick nehmen.

Mit über drei Millionen ausschließlich geringfügig Erwerbstätigen ist diese Form atypischer Arbeitsverhältnisse ein nicht unwesentlicher Bestandteil des deutschen Arbeitsmarktes. Dabei zeigen die Untersuchungsergebnisse, daß Haushalte, in denen geringfügig Erwerbstätige leben, ein relativ niedriges Einkommen haben. Der Verdienst aus dieser Erwerbstätigkeit ist daher häufig mehr als nur ein kleines Zubrot. Ein möglicher Einkommensverlust durch die Einführung einer Sozialversicherungspflicht ist aus diesem Grund nicht unproblematisch.