Worker Beliefs about Outside Options
Simon Jäger, Christopher Roth, Nina Roussille, Benjamin Schoefer
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Nr. 3,
2024
Abstract
Standard labor market models assume that workers hold accurate beliefs about the external wage distribution, and hence their outside options with other employers. We test this assumption by comparing German workers’ beliefs about outside options with objective benchmarks. First, we find that workers wrongly anchor their beliefs about outside options on their current wage: workers that would experience a 10% wage change if switching to their outside option only expect a 1% change. Second, workers in low-paying firms underestimate wages elsewhere. Third, in response to information about the wages of similar workers, respondents correct their beliefs about their outside options and change their job search and wage negotiation intentions. Finally, we analyze the consequences of anchoring in a simple equilibrium model. In the model, anchored beliefs keep overly pessimistic workers stuck in low-wage jobs, which gives rise to monopsony power and labor market segmentation.
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Non-Standard Errors
Albert J. Menkveld, Anna Dreber, Felix Holzmeister, Juergen Huber, Magnus Johannesson, Michael Koetter, Markus Kirchner, Sebastian Neusüss, Michael Razen, Utz Weitzel, Shuo Xia, et al.
Journal of Finance,
Nr. 3,
2024
Abstract
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence-generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer-review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.
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Does Information about Inequality and Discrimination in Early Child Care Affect Policy Preferences?
Henning Hermes, Philipp Lergetporer, Fabian Mierisch, Guido Schwerdt, Simon Wiederhold
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 2,
2024
Abstract
We investigate public preferences for equity-enhancing policies in access to early child care, using a survey experiment with a representative sample of the German population (n ≈ 4, 800). We observe strong misperceptions about migrant-native inequalities in early child care that vary by respondents’ age and right-wing voting preferences. Randomly providing information about the actual extent of inequalities has a nuanced impact on the support for equity-enhancing policy reforms: it increases support for respondents who initially underestimated these inequalities, and tends to decrease support for those who initially overestimated them. This asymmetric effect leads to a more consensual policy view, substantially decreasing the polarization in policy support between under- and overestimators. Our results suggest that correcting misperceptions can align public policy preferences, potentially leading to less polarized debates about how to address inequalities and discrimination.
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Does Information about Inequality and Discrimination in Early Child Care Affect Policy Preferences?
Henning Hermes, Philipp Lergetporer, Fabian Mierisch, Guido Schwerdt, Simon Wiederhold
CESifo Working Paper,
Nr. 10925,
2024
Abstract
We investigate public preferences for equity-enhancing policies in access to early child care, using a survey experiment with a representative sample of the German population (n ≈ 4, 800). We observe strong misperceptions about migrant-native inequalities in early child care that vary by respondents’ age and right-wing voting preferences. Randomly providing information about the actual extent of inequalities has a nuanced impact on the support for equity-enhancing policy reforms: it increases support for respondents who initially underestimated these inequalities, and tends to decrease support for those who initially overestimated them. This asymmetric effect leads to a more consensual policy view, substantially decreasing the polarization in policy support between under- and overestimators. Our results suggest that correcting misperceptions can align public policy preferences, potentially leading to less polarized debates about how to address inequalities and discrimination.
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Microdata for Economic Research in Europe: Challenges and Proposals
Eric Bartelsman, Marco Matani, Filippo di Mauro, Sergio Inferrera, Ugo Panizza, Michael Polder
CEPR,
Nr. 18640,
2023
Abstract
While access to high-quality microdata is essential for economic research and policy evaluation, effective access to such data remains limited in Europe. It varies from country to country, with uneven information on access procedures. This is a major obstacle to social science research, including research on European competitiveness and the effects of climate change, inequality, globalization, and digitalization. The objective of this paper, which is based on a brainstorming exercise coordinated by CEPR and CompNet, is to assess the status quo and discuss a series of proposals for improving access to Microdata for economic research. We underline the need for developing the relevant tools for extended access to and use of European business statistics microdata. Building such tools entails both establishing the requested microdata and creating a body facilitating cross-country access to the established databases with harmonized content.
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Economic Sentiment: Disentangling Private Information from Public Knowledge
Katja Heinisch, Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 15,
2021
Abstract
This paper addresses a general problem with the use of surveys as source of information about the state of an economy: Answers to surveys are highly dependent on information that is publicly available, while only additional information that is not already publicly known has the potential to improve a professional forecast. We propose a simple procedure to disentangle the private information of agents from knowledge that is already publicly known for surveys that ask for general as well as for private prospects. Our results reveal the potential of our proposed technique for the usage of European Commissions‘ consumer surveys for economic forecasting for Germany.
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Economic Failure and the Role of Plant Age and Size
Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Small Business Economics,
Nr. 3,
2015
Abstract
This paper introduces a large-scale administrative panel data set on corporate bankruptcy in Germany that allows for an econometric analysis of involuntary exits where previous studies mixed voluntary and involuntary exits. Approximately 83 % of all bankruptcies occur in plants with not more than 10 employees, and 61 % of all bankrupt plants are not older than 5 years. The descriptive statistics and regression analysis indicate substantial negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk but confirm negative size dependence for mature plants only. Our results corroborate hypotheses stressing increasing capabilities and positional advantage, both predicting negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk due to productivity improvements. The results are not consistent with the theories explaining age dependence via imprinting or structural inertia.
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Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 8,
2008
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming
from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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