This paper examines how political networks influence insider trading in China. Using biographical data to construct chairman–politician social networks, we find that firms with stronger political networks engage in significantly less insider trading. The effect is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and for long-standing or high-ranking connections. The muted trading persists during periods when insiders possess valuable private information, including prior to M&A announcements and major policy events. The evidence suggests that personal political networks function as informal governance mechanisms that discipline managerial opportunism when formal governance through state ownership is absent.

We document a global reallocation of pollutive assets as a response to investor pressure: large firms facing increased investor pressure divest foreign-located pollutive assets to firms that are less in the limelight. There is no evidence of increased engagement in any other emission reduction activities. We estimate that 369 million metric tons (mt) of CO2e are reallocated via divestments in the post-Paris Agreement period. Our results indicate that investor pressure to decarbonize reshapes the global conglomerate structure of large firms.

Exploiting the executive compensation reform for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China that enforce strict pay restrictions, this study examines whether and how pay restrictions affect firms’ labor investment inefficiency. We find that SOEs experience a decrease in abnormal labor investment following the reform relative to non-SOEs, particularly in over-investment in labor. Our results show that the reform is associated with lower labor investment inefficiency through strengthened internal governance and mitigated internal social comparison. In addition, pay restrictions specifically curb firms’ tendency to over-hire. Further analysis reveals that imposing pay restrictions on executives enhances labor quality and also promotes employee well-being. This study offers novel policy insights by showing how pay restrictions to SOE executives can reduce vertical agency costs and investment inefficiency and enhance workforce quality and well-being in weak institutional environments.

We study the procurement patterns of non-listed firms and examine how these often-overlooked, yet pivotal players in global supply chains adjust their sourcing when they anticipate accountability for externalities beyond their organizational boundaries. Using granular customs data and a surprise information release about the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act, product-level regressions reveal that importing firms are 3.5 percentage points less likely to source a product from countries where the relevant production sector exhibits elevated ESG-related risks, suggesting that firms tend to cut ties with higher-risk suppliers. The effects are concentrated among firms with well-diversified supplier networks for a product and higher profitability, suggesting they have the necessary flexibility to respond quickly to anticipated regulatory pressure. Our findings suggest that mandates requiring firms to incorporate broad sustainability considerations into their operational decisions may have limits, particularly for non-listed firms.

We exploit an information shock related to the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act and use detailed customs data to analyze how smaller, non-listed firms respond when expecting accountability for externalities beyond their organizational boundaries. Product-level regressions reveal a substantial reduction in imports from high ESG-risk production sectors. Adjustments occur mainly at the extensive margin, indicating that firms cut ties with high-risk suppliers. The product-level results translate into meaningful changes in overall international procurement for firms with Big Four auditors. Our findings suggest potential limits to mandates requiring firms to integrate broad sustainability considerations into operational decisions.

Lowering carbon intensity in manufacturing is necessary to transform current production technologies. We test if local agents’ preferences, revealed by vote shares for the Green party during local elections in Germany, relate to the carbon intensity of investments in production technologies. Our sample comprises all investment choices made by manufacturing establishments from 2005-2017. Our results suggest that ecological preferences correlate with significantly fewer carbon-intensive investment projects while investments stimulating growth and reducing carbon emissions increase by 14 percentage points. Both results are more distinct in federal states where the Green Party enjoys political power and local ecological preferences are high.

Das Produktionspotenzial der deutschen Wirtschaft wächst mittelfristig (2023 bis 2029) mit einer jahresdurchschnittlichen Rate von 0,3% und damit deutlich schwächer als in den Jahren zuvor. Dies ist auf eine ungünstigere Entwicklung aller drei Faktoren (Arbeitsvolumen, Kapitalstock, totale Faktorproduktivität) zurückzuführen. Das potenzielle Wachstum wird insbesondere durch den Rückgang der durchschnittlichen Arbeitszeit gedämpft.

This paper studies whether common ownership affects the direction of technological change. We develop a task-based model in which commonly owned firms internalize wage externalities from labor market rivals, increasing incentives to automate. We establish causality by exploiting institutional investor mergers in a dynamic DiD design, using U.S. data on institutional ownership, establishment-level employment, and automation patents. When institutional investor mergers increase common ownership among labor market rivals, the annual probability of those firms producing an automation patent increases by 3.79 percentage points and employment growth falls by 3.8 percentage points on average. Both effects disappear without labor market overlap.

We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.