This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.

Exploiting the executive compensation reform for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China that enforce strict pay restrictions, this study examines whether and how pay restrictions affect firms’ labor investment inefficiency. We find that SOEs experience a decrease in abnormal labor investment following the reform relative to non-SOEs, particularly in over-investment in labor. Our results show that the reform is associated with lower labor investment inefficiency through strengthened internal governance and mitigated internal social comparison. In addition, pay restrictions specifically curb firms’ tendency to over-hire. Further analysis reveals that imposing pay restrictions on executives enhances labor quality and also promotes employee well-being. This study offers novel policy insights by showing how pay restrictions to SOE executives can reduce vertical agency costs and investment inefficiency and enhance workforce quality and well-being in weak institutional environments.

We review an empirical literature that studies how political polarization affects financial decisions. We first discuss the degree of partisan segregation in finance and corporate America, the mechanisms through which partisanship may influence financial decisions, and the available data sources used to infer individuals’ partisan leanings. We then describe and discuss the empirical evidence. Our review suggests an economically large and often growing partisan gap in the financial decisions of households, corporate executives, and financial intermediaries. Partisan alignment between individuals explains team and financial relationship formation, with initial evidence suggesting that high levels of partisan homogeneity may be associated with economic costs. We conclude by proposing several promising directions for future research.

The focus of this paper is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation SHO strengthens or weakens the effect of short-selling threats on banks’ risk-taking. The evidence shows that pilot banks with looser constraints on short-selling increased their risk-taking during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The reason is that short-selling threats improved the information environment and mitigated the agency problems of banks during the pilot program that led to greater risk-taking by pilot banks. Additionally, this effect is mainly driven by pilot banks with poor corporate governance, or high information asymmetry. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence that the disciplinary role of short-sellers had a positive effect on bank risk-taking during the financial crisis.

Based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF), we score 10-K text to measure company culture in four types (collaborative, controlling, competitive, and creative) and examine its role in firm stability. We find that firms with higher controlling culture fared significantly better during the 2008–09 crisis. Firms with stronger controlling culture experienced fewer layoffs, less negative asset growth, greater debt issuance, and increased access to credit-line facilities during the crisis. The positive effect of the controlling culture is stronger among the financially-constrained firms. Overall, the controlling culture improves firm stability through greater support from capital providers.

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We study the implications of such dual holdings for corporate governance and firm decision-making. We present evidence that dual ownership allows financially distressed firms to increase investments and to refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants. As such, dual ownership reduces shareholder-creditor conflicts, especially when families encourage cooperation among their managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the shareholder-creditor agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

The aim of this paper is to bring economics-based finance research more into the focus of international business theory. On the basis of an analytical model that introduces financial constraints into incomplete contracting in an international vertical trade relationship, we propose an integrated framework that facilitates the study of the interdependencies between internalisation decisions, firm-internal allocations of control rights, and the debt capacity of firms. We argue that the financial constraint of an MNE and/or its supplier should be considered as an important determinant of internal governance structures, complementary to, and interacting with, institutional factors and proprietary knowledge.

Die zahlreichen Unternehmenszusammenbrüche, Bilanzskandale sowie der Absturz der Indizes an den Kapitalmärkten zu Beginn des neuen Jahrtausends verstärkten die Diskussion um die Unternehmensführung und -kontrolle in Deutschland und führten schließlich vor nunmehr fast drei Jahren zur Verabschiedung des deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex. Dieser Verhaltenskodex, der sich an börsennotierte Gesellschaften richtet, greift internationale Kritikpunkte an der deutschen Unternehmensverfassung auf und soll somit den Standort Deutschland für ausländische Investoren attraktiver machen und das Vertrauen der Anleger zurückgewinnen. Ob dies gelungen ist, soll in dieser Studie ebenso untersucht werden, wie die Frage, ob und in welchen Bereichen der Kodex mit seinen Anforderungen von den Unternehmen akzeptiert wird...

Wirtschaft im Wandel 6/2001 147 Ein zentrales Element der Transformationsprozesse in den Länder Mittel- und Osteuropas sind institutionelle Anpassungen. Diese Anpassungspro- zesse sind unabdingbare Voraussetzung für ein stabiles, längerfristiges Wirtschaftswachstum. Ein wichtiger Bestandteil der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen ist dabei das Insolvenzrecht. Im Zuge der Novellierung des russischen Insolvenzgesetzes vom März 1998 kam es zu einem Anstieg der Unternehmensinsolvenzen. Die steigenden Insolvenz- zahlen sind im Sinne einer härteren Budgetrestriktion für die Unternehmen und verstärkten Anreizen für eine bessere Unternehmensführung positiv zu beurteilen. Gleichwohl bestehen noch erhebliche institutionelle Hemmnisse: Die Sanierungsverfahren von insolventen Unternehmen werden häufig noch zur Konkursverschleppung zweckentfremdet. Staatliche Gläubiger betrieben den Forderungseinzug gegenüber säumigen Schuldnern weniger energisch als andere Gläubiger und setzten so teilweise die Subventionierung von Unternehmen verdeckt fort. Die schwache Stellung der gesicherten Gläubiger im Insolvenzverfahren ist weiterhin unbefriedigend. Eine Besserstellung dieser Gruppe könnte den Unternehmen einen leichteren Zugang zu Krediten eröffnen und damit positive Impulse für die Fortsetzung der realwirtschaftlichen Transformation liefern.