We examine the effects of the big five personalities of CEOs (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) on their annual compensation. We hand-collect the tweets of S&P 1500 CEOs and use IBM's Watson Personality Insights to measure their personalities. CEOs with high ratings of agreeableness and conscientiousness get more compensation. We further find that the firms with these CEOs outperform their peers due to better investment efficiency. Firms are willing to pay higher compensation for talent, especially for firms with better operations, located in states with higher labor unionization, or facing higher competition in the product market. Overall, CEO personality is a valid predictor of CEOs' compensation.

While the drastic physical impacts of climate change and related natural hazards are increasingly apparent, little is known about the long-term behavioral consequences of climate change-related experiences. Psychological evidence suggests that climate change (CC)-related experiences induce people to make more climate-friendly choices. Building on Upper Echelons Theory and relevant psychological literature, we investigate whether early-life natural hazard experiences of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are associated with more climate-friendly policies during their tenure. Our sample covers decisions taken between 1991 and 2018 by 447 US-born CEOs. While we observe an effect of hazard experiences on climate policies, we do not observe the same effect when focusing only on CC-related experiences. This result is robust across different measures of corporate climate performance.

Der „umgekehrte Drehtüreffekt“ beschreibt das Phänomen, wenn ehemalige Bankerinnen und Banker Vorstandspositionen in nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden (National Supervisory Agency, NSA) bekleiden. Ein neu erhobener Datensatz zeigt, dass etwa ein Drittel der Vorstandsmitglieder in europäischen NSA vorher in der Finanzindustrie tätig war. Die Bestellung ehemaliger Banker in NSA-Vorstände geht mit positiven Börsenreaktionen einher, was auf eine „Näheprämie“ in der Bewertung beaufsichtigter Banken hindeutet. Im Gegensatz dazu ruft die Berufung von Bürokraten ohne praktische Vorkenntnisse in der Bankenwelt negative Börsenreaktionen hervor. Bis zur Einführung des Einheitlichen Aufsichtsmechanismus (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) in Europa korreliert die Präsenz ehemaliger Banker in NSA-Vorständen mit einer geringeren regulatorischen Kapitalquote, was auf einen nachsichtigeren Aufsichtsstil schließen lässt.