Juniorprofessorin Huyen Nguyen, Ph.D.

Juniorprofessorin Huyen Nguyen, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/20

Leiterin der Forschungsgruppe Die Finanzökonomik der Immobilienmärkte und Regulierung

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 10/19

wissensschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 10/19


Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena


  • finanzwirtschaftliche Entwicklung
  • Bankenregulierung
  • Hypothekenmarkt

Huyen Nguyen ist seit Oktober 2019 als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in der Abteilung Finanzmärkte und als Juniorprofessorin an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena tätig. Ihre Forschungsinteressen liegen in den Bereichen Hypothekenmarkt, Bankenregulierung und -aufsicht sowie Finanzwirtschaft.

Huyen Nguyen studierte an der Foreign Trade University of Vietnam und der Bangor University. Sie promovierte an der University of Nottingham. Bevor Huyen Nguyen zum IWH kam, war sie unter anderem als Senior Research Associate an der University of Bristol tätig und besuchte als Gastwissenschaftlerin die Bank of England, die Deutsche Bundesbank und den Internationalen Währungsfonds.

Ihr Kontakt

Juniorprofessorin Huyen Nguyen, Ph.D.
Juniorprofessorin Huyen Nguyen, Ph.D.
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
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Deposit Competition and the Securitisation Boom

Danny McGowan Huyen Nguyen

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 6, 2021


We provide novel evidence that regulatory-induced deposit market competition provoked banks to enter the securitisation market. Exploiting the state-specific removal of interstate bank branching restrictions across U.S states between 1994 and 2006 as an exogenous source of deposit competition, we document four key results. First, the interstate branching deregulation leads to an intensification of deposit market competition. Second, this rise in the cost of deposits increases the probability that a bank operates an ‘originate-to-distribute’ model by 6%. Third, the securitisation effect holds across bank asset classes but is most pronounced for mortgages. Finally, the results are strongest among small and single state banks owing to their reliance on deposit funding. The evidence is consistent with theories where increasing the cost of deposits creates incentives for banks to use securitisation as a cheaper loan funding model. The findings highlight a hitherto neglected supply-side explanation for the rapid expansion in securitisation before the financial crisis and speak to the debate about banking competition policy.

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To Securitise or to Price Credit Default Risk?

Huyen Nguyen Danny McGowan

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 10, 2020


We evaluate if lenders price or securitise mortgages to mitigate credit risk. Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk created by differences in foreclosure law along US state borders, we find that financial institutions respond to the law in heterogeneous ways. In the agency market where Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) provide implicit loan guarantees, lenders transfer credit risk using securitisation and do not price credit risk into mortgage contracts. In the non-agency market, where there is no such guarantee, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate about the design of loan guarantees, the common interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk leads to an increase in the GSEs‘ debt holdings by $79.5 billion per annum, exposing taxpayers to preventable losses in the housing market.

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