Juniorprofessorin Huyen Nguyen, Ph.D.

Juniorprofessorin Huyen Nguyen, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/20

Leiterin der Forschungsgruppe Risikoverlagerung in Finanzmärkten und nachhaltige Finanzierung

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 10/19


Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena

seit 10/19

Mitglied der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)


  • Wohnungsmärkte
  • nachhaltige Finanzierung
  • empirische Bankenforschung
  • Finanzökonomik

Huyen Nguyen ist seit Oktober 2019 als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in der Abteilung Finanzmärkte und als Juniorprofessorin an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena tätig. Ihre Forschungsinteressen liegen in den Bereichen Wohnungsmarkt, empirische Bankenforschung, nachhaltige Finanzierung sowie Finanzökonomik.

Huyen Nguyen studierte an der Foreign Trade University of Vietnam und der Bangor University. Sie promovierte an der University of Nottingham. Bevor Huyen Nguyen zum IWH kam, war sie unter anderem als Senior Research Associate an der University of Bristol tätig und besuchte als Gastwissenschaftlerin die Bank of England, die Deutsche Bundesbank und den Internationalen Währungsfonds.

Ihr Kontakt

Juniorprofessorin Huyen Nguyen, Ph.D.
Juniorprofessorin Huyen Nguyen, Ph.D.
- Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-756 Persönliche Seite



To Securitize or To Price Credit Risk?

Danny McGowan Huyen Nguyen

in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen


Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings. 

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Regulating Zombie Mortgages

Jonathan Lee Duc Duy Nguyen Huyen Nguyen

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 16, 2024


Using the adoption of Zombie Property Law (ZL) across several US states, we show that increased lender accountability in the foreclosure process affects mortgage lending decisions and standards. Difference-in-differences estimations using a state border design show that ZL incentivizes lenders to screen mortgage applications more carefully: they deny more applications and impose higher interest rates on originated loans, especially risky loans. In turn, these loans exhibit higher ex-post performance. ZL also affects lender behavior after borrowers become distressed, causing them to strategically keep delinquent mortgages alive. Our findings inform the debate on policy responses to foreclosure crises.

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Climate Stress Tests, Bank Lending, and the Transition to the Carbon-neutral Economy

Larissa Fuchs Huyen Nguyen Trang Nguyen Klaus Schaeck

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 9, 2024


We ask if bank supervisors’ efforts to combat climate change affect banks’ lending and their borrowers’ transition to the carbon-neutral economy. Combining information from the French supervisory agency’s climate pilot exercise with borrowers’ emission data, we first show that banks that participate in the exercise increase lending to high-carbon emitters but simultaneously charge higher interest rates. Second, participating banks collect new information about climate risks, and boost lending for green purposes. Third, receiving credit from a participating bank facilitates borrowers’ efforts to improve environmental performance. Our findings establish a hitherto undocumented link between banking supervision and the transition to net-zero.

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Carbon Transition Risk and Corporate Loan Securitization

Isabella Müller Huyen Nguyen Trang Nguyen

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 22, 2022


We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.

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