Shuo Xia, Ph.D.

Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/19

Leiter der Forschungsgruppe Matching und Anreize in Finanzmärkten

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 9/18

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Unternehmensführung
  • Unternehmensfinanzierung

Shuo Xia ist seit September 2018 Mitglied der Abteilung Finanzmärkte. Er forscht zu Themen der Unternehmensfinanzierung und Unternehmensführung.

Shuo Xia studierte an der Beijing University of Technology, University of Essex und an der VU Amsterdam. Er promovierte an der Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Ihr Kontakt

Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-875 Persönliche Seite

Publikationen

Arbeitspapiere

Lame-Duck CEOs

Marc Gabarro Sebastian Gryglewicz Shuo Xia

in: SSRN Working Papers, 2018

Abstract

We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.

Publikation lesen

Selection Versus Incentives in Incentive Pay: Evidence from a Matching Model

Shuo Xia

in: SSRN Working Papers, 2018

Abstract

Higher incentive pay is associated with better firm performance. I introduce a model of CEO-firm matching to disentangle the two confounding effects that drive this result. On one hand, higher incentive pay directly induces more effort; on the other hand, higher incentive pay indirectly attracts more talented CEOs. I find both effects are essential to explain the result, with the selection effect accounting for 12.7% of the total effect. The relative importance of the selection effect is the largest in industries with high talent mobility and in more recent years.

Publikation lesen
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