Juniorprofessor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.

Juniorprofessor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 9/15

Leiter der Forschungsgruppe Recht und Finanzen

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 9/15

Juniorprofessor

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Magdeburg

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • empirische Unternehmensfinanzierung
  • Relationship Banking
  • Unternehmensführung
  • Rechts- und Finanzwissenschaft

Stefano Colonnello ist seit September 2015 als wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Abteilung Finanzmärkte und als Juniorprofessor an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg tätig. Seine Forschungsinteressen liegen in den Bereichen Rechts- und Finanzwissenschaft, empirische Unternehmensfinanzierung, Unternehmensführung sowie Finanzinstitutionen.

Stefano Colonnello studierte an der Bocconi University in Mailand. Seine Promotion erfolgte an der École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne und am Swiss Finance Institute.

Ihr Kontakt

Juniorprofessor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
Juniorprofessor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
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Publikationen

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Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt

Stefano Colonnello Giuliano Curatola Ngoc Giang Hoang

in: Journal of Corporate Finance, August 2017

Abstract

We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is compensated with salary, equity and inside debt. We seek to understand the joint implications of this compensation package for managerial risk-taking incentives and credit spreads. We show that the size and seniority of inside debt not only are crucial for the relation between inside debt and credit spreads but also play an important role in shaping the relation between equity compensation and credit spreads. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions.

Publikation lesen

Arbeitspapiere

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Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Konstantin Wagner

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 7, 2018

Abstract

We study if the regulation of bank executive compensation has unintended consequences. Based on novel data on CEO and non-CEO executives in EU banking, we show that capping the variable-to-fixed compensation ratio did not induce executives to abandon the industry. Banks indemnified executives sufficiently for the shock to retain them by raising fixed and lowering variable compensation while complying with the cap. At the same time, banks‘ risk-adjusted performance deteriorated due to increased idiosyncratic risk. Collateral damage for the financial system as a whole appears modest though, as average co-movement of banks with the market declined under the cap.

Publikation lesen

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Pricing Sin Stocks: Ethical Preference vs. Risk Aversion

Stefano Colonnello Giuliano Curatola Alessandro Gioffré

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 20, 2017

Abstract

We develop a model that reproduces the return and volatility spread between sin and non-sin stocks, where investors trade off dividends with the ethical assessment of companies. We relax the assumption of boycott behaviour and investigate the role played by the dividend share of sin stocks on their return and volatility spread relative to non-sin stocks. We empirically show that the dividend share predicts a positive return and volatility spread. This pattern is reproduced by our model when dividends and ethicalness are complementary goods and investors are sufficiently risk averse.

Publikation lesen

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Internal Governance and Creditor Governance: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps

Stefano Colonnello

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 6, 2017

Abstract

I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.

Publikation lesen
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