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Dr. Thomas Krause

Dr. Thomas Krause
Aktuelle Position

seit 3/18

Programme Manager des IWH Doctoral Programme in Economics (IWH-DPE)

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 11/13

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Finanzmarktstabilität und Bankenregulierung
  • politische Ökonomie des Bankensystems
  • Haushaltsfinanzierung und Häusermarkt

Thomas Krause ist seit November 2013 Mitglied der Abteilung Finanzmärkte. Des Weiteren ist er seit 2018 Programme Manager des Doktorandenprogramms am IWH. Er forscht zu Themen der Stabilität von Finanzmärkten, der Bankenregulierung sowie der Wechselwirkung zwischen Finanzmarktfriktionen und Realwirtschaft.

Thomas Krause studierte an der Universität Leipzig und verbrachte ein Auslandssemester an der Ohio University. Er promovierte an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg.

Ihr Kontakt

Dr. Thomas Krause
Dr. Thomas Krause
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-839 Persönliche Seite

Publikationen

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Complexity and Bank Risk During the Financial Crisis

Thomas Krause Talina Sondershaus Lena Tonzer

in: Economics Letters, January 2017

Abstract

We construct a novel dataset to measure banks’ complexity and relate it to banks’ riskiness. The sample covers stock listed Euro area banks from 2007 to 2014. Bank stability is significantly affected by complexity, whereas the direction of the effect differs across complexity measures.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation

Michael Koetter Thomas Krause Lena Tonzer

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 24, 2017

Abstract

To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.

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Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and European perspectives differ?

Claudia M. Buch Thomas Krause Lena Tonzer

in: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers, Nr. 9, 2017

Abstract

In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.

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Bank-specific Shocks and House Price Growth in the U.S.

F. Bremus Thomas Krause Felix Noth

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 3, 2017

Abstract

This paper investigates the link between mortgage supply shocks at the banklevel and regional house price growth in the U.S. using micro-level data on mortgage markets from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for the 1990-2014 period. Our results suggest that bank-specific mortgage supply shocks indeed affect house price growth at the regional level. The larger the idiosyncratic shocks to newly issued mortgages, the stronger is house price growth. We show that the positive link between idiosyncratic mortgage shocks and regional house price growth is very robust and economically meaningful, however not very persistent since it fades out after two years.

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Verknüpfte Begriffe

Evaluierung von Politikmaßnahmen Neues Europa Regulierung Finanzinstitutionen Haushalte
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