The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
No. 3,
2007
Abstract
How do banks react to increased competition? Recent banking theory significantly disagrees regarding the impact of competition on bank orientation—i.e., the choice of relationship-based versus transactional banking. We empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch orientation. We employ a unique data set containing detailed information on bank–firm relationships. We find that bank branches facing stiff local competition engage considerably more in relationship-based lending. Our results illustrate that competition and relationships are not necessarily inimical.
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Repercusiones de la integración y consolidación de los sectores bancarios europeos sobre la innovación y las actividades de los emprendedores
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena, Maria Fabiana Penas
Papeles de Economía Española,
No. 110,
2006
Abstract
En este artículo se analiza si el programa de intensificación de la integración del sector financier europeo puede dañar a la innovación y al crecimiento en Europa. En particular, es preciso resaltar los problemas que dicha integración financiera puede ocasionar sobre los últimos avances en materia de desarrollo empresarial. La integración financiera, al intensificar la competencia y la consolidación del sector bancario europeo, podría poner en peligro la financiación procedente de las fuentes más innovadoras. Sin embargo, al sopesar los datos actuales, la conclusión es que estos problemas serían, a lo sumo, transitorios.
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The Effects of Shared ATM Networks on the Efficiency of Turkish Banks
H. Evren Damar
Applied Economics,
No. 6,
2006
Abstract
This study investigates whether forming shared ATM networks has yielded positive benefits for banks in Turkey by increasing their productive efficiency. Using a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach, pure technical and scale efficiency scores of Turkish banks are estimated and analysed for the period 2000–2003. The results suggest that although it is possible to realize positive effects through ATM sharing arrangements, there are multiple factors that determine which banks realize such benefits. The geographical distribution of shared ATMs between urban and rural markets and the level of competition between banks within urban areas are shown to be important determinants of differences in bank efficiency. This discrepancy between the gains associated with ATM sharing may have important implications concerning the adoption and sharing of new technology by banks in developing countries.
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Clustering or Competition? The Foreign Investment Behavior of German Banks
Claudia M. Buch, A. Lipponer
International Journal of Central Banking,
2006
Abstract
Banks often concentrate their foreign direct investment (FDI) in certain countries. This clustering of activities could reflect either the attractiveness of a particular country or agglomeration effects. To find out which of the two phenomena dominates, we need to control for country-specific factors. We use new bank-level data on German banks’ FDI for the 1996-2003 period.We test whether the presence of other banks has a positive impact on the entry of new banks. Once we control for the attractiveness of a country through fixed effects, the negative impact of competition dominates. Hence, pure clustering effects are rather unimportant.
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Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.
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Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
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