We build a granular dataset of residential property yields using rental and sale listings from a major German real estate platform. With more than 1.5 million property-level rent-to-price ratios, we document a novel heterogeneity puzzle. About two-fifths of yield dispersion remains unexplained after controlling for extensive observable property characteristics and postal code-level time-varying factors using fixed effects. When we absorb finer neighborhood amenities through richer fixed effects, the unexplained share remains close to one-third. This evidence points to the importance of investors’ beliefs and preferences—rather than several alternative explanations we test—as sources of heterogeneity in risk premia.

Aktuell wird diskutiert, die geringfügige Beschäftigung (Minijobs) stark einzuschränken.¹ Es wird kritisiert, dass Minijobs zur Absenkung arbeitsrechtlicher Standards führen sowie Schwarzarbeit begünstigen und den Wettbewerb verzerren. Darum wird vorgeschlagen, die Minijobs schrittweise in reguläre sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigungsverhältnisse zu überführen.

Real estate is a capstone connection between various economic agents and markets. It is the main store of household wealth, serves as collateral for mortgage loans in the banking system, aids the transmission of monetary policy, and can propagate financial crises when overvalued. Yet comparable house-price data across the European Union (EU) and the euro area is unavailable, which hinders the design and evaluation of common monetary and economic policy that operates across heterogeneous housing markets. We derive monthly subnational European Real Estate Indicators (EREI) from online residential property advertisements in 16 European countries. The release covers April 2024 to June 2026 and contains 48,168 region-month-segment observations for 1,154 NUTS 3 regions, aggregating more than 43 million listing observations across the monthly sale and rental cross-sections. Each region-month segment reports the number of advertisements and summary statistics for asking prices per square meter and listing durations. The release also includes sale-segment indices for Europe, the euro area, and individual countries. Thirteen covered countries are EU members, which represented 85% of EU-27 gross domestic product in 2024. EREI data support research on a wide range of socio-economic phenomena associated with real estate dynamics, such as the evaluation of monetary policy or macroprudential policy effects on financial stability.

We show that online listing prices closely approximate transaction prices across Europe. Our validation uses the IWH European Real Estate Index (EREI), a near-real-time database of monthly purchase prices, rents, listing counts, and time on market for 1,154 NUTS-3 regions in 16 countries since April 2024. With publication lags as short as one month, validated listing prices offer a timely, comparable complement to official house price statistics. Purchase price levels correlate between 0.94 and 0.97 with transaction prices in the five most populous markets, while calibration slopes range from 0.95 to 1.00. Aggregate listing prices exceed benchmark transaction prices by 13% to 22%.

This paper provides new causal evidence on how patent allowances affect firms and their employees based on quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Exploiting employer-employee records with newly linked German firm data and web-scraped patent documents, we show that patent-induced shocks reduce firm exit, improve productivity, and increase wages, with rent-sharing elasticities between 0.10 and 0.21. Wage gains are broadly observed across occupational tasks, with high heterogeneity: managers benefit disproportionately in publicly traded firms, whereas broader wage increases accrue to workers in non-traded firms. Our findings highlight the role of institutional features and firm organization in shaping how rents are shared.

This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing. Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.

Im September 2025 reisten Finanzökonomen aus aller Welt zum elften Mal nach Halle, um am jährlichen FIN-FIRE-Workshop am IWH teilzunehmen. Zwei Tage lang gaben die Autoren von zehn Beiträgen einen umfassenden Überblick über aktuelle Themen, die potenzielle Herausforderungen für das Finanzsystem darstellen, z. B. mangelnden Datenschutz bei der Vergabe von Immobilienkrediten, Unsicherheiten in Anleihemärkten aufgrund von Klimarisiken, Intransparenz bei synthetischen Risikotransferprodukten, die Auswirkungen geopolitischer Risiken auf die Kreditvergabe sowie granulare Friktionen bei der Transmission geldpolitischer Maßnahmen. Ein intensiver Gedankenaustausch zwischen Autoren, Ko-Referenten und Plenum führte zu neuen Erkenntnissen über die Widerstandsfähigkeit und Fragilität unserer Finanzsysteme.