Vertical and horizontal patterns of intra-industry trade between EU and candidate countries
Hubert Gabrisch
IWH-Sonderhefte,
Nr. 2,
2003
Abstract
Trade between the European Union (EU) and the Transition Economies (TE) is increasingly characterised by intra-industry trade. The decomposition of intra-industry trade into horizontal and vertical shares reveals predominantly vertical structures with decisively more quality advantages for the EU and less quality advantages for TE countries whenever trade has been liberalised. Empirical research on factors determining this structure in a EU-TE framework lags behind theoretical and empirical research on horizontal and vertical trade in other regions of the world. The main objective of this paper is therefore to contribute to the ongoing debate on EU-TE trade structures by offering an explanation of vertical trade. We utilise a cross-country approach in which relative wage differences, country size and income distribution play a leading role. We find first that relative differences in wages (per capita income) and country size explain intraindustry trade when trade is vertical and completely liberalised, and second that crosscountry differences in income distribution play no explanatory role. We conclude that EU firms have been able to increase their product quality and to shift low-quality segments to TE countries. This may suggest a product-quality cycle prevalent in EU-TE trade.
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Investitionsförderung-Ost: Grundlegende Reformen wagen! - ein Kommentar
Joachim Ragnitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 16,
2002
Abstract
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Intra-industry trade between European Union and Transition Economies. Does income distribution matter?
Hubert Gabrisch, Maria Luigia Segnana
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 155,
2002
Abstract
EU-TE trade is increasingly characterised by intra-industry trade. For some countries (Czech Republic), the share of intra-industry trade in total trade with the EU approaches 60 percent. The decomposition of intra-industry trade into horizontal and vertical shares reveals overwhelming vertical structures with strong quality advantages for the EU and shrinking quality advantages for TE countries wherever trade has been liberalised. Empirical research on factors determining this structure in an EU-TE framework has lagged theoretical and empirical research on horizontal trade and vertical trade in other regions of the world. The main objective of this paper is, therefore, to contribute to the ongoing debate over EU-TE trade structures, by offering an explanation of intra-industry trade. We utilize a cross-country approach in which relative wage differences and country size play a leading role. In addition, as implied by a model of the productquality
cycle, we examine income distribution factors as determinates of the emerging
EU-TE structure of trade flows. Using OLS regressions, we find first, that relative
differences in wages (per capita income) and country size explain intra-industry trade, when trade is vertical and completely liberalized and second, that cross country differences in income distribution play no explanatory role. We conclude that if increasing wage differences resulted from an increasing productivity gap between highquality and low-quality industries, then vertical structures will, over the long-term create significant barriers for the increase in TE incomes and lowering EU-TE income differentials.
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Wage Dynamics in Germany
Jürgen Wiemers
Externe Publikationen,
2001
Abstract
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Europäische Geldpolitik: Auf neutralem Kurs
Silke Tober
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 10,
2000
Abstract
Nach fünf Leitzinserhöhungen um insgesamt 1¾ Prozentpunkte seit November 1999 dürfte die Europäische Zentralbank im Juni dieses Jahres auch bei den kurzfristigen Zinsen ein neutrales Niveau erreicht haben. Die Kapitalmarktzinsen entsprechen bereits seit Herbst vergangenen Jahres etwa dem langfristigen (deutschen) Durchschnitt. Ebenso wie die EZB hat die US-amerikanische Zentralbank die Zinsen seit der geldpolitischen Lockerung im Zusammenhang mit den Krisen in Asien um insgesamt 1¾ Prozentpunkte angehoben. Anders als die EZB ist die US-amerikanische Zentralbank damit jedoch auf einen restriktiven Kurs zurückgekehrt. Dieser Unterschied im geldpolitischen Kurs der beiden Zentralbanken erklärt sich aus dem nach wie vor bestehenden Konjunkturgefälle zwischen den zwei Währungsräumen und ist die entscheidende Ursache für die noch fortbestehende niedrige Bewertung des Euro. Von der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union und letztlich des Euroraums ist keine nennenswerte Beeinflussung des Wechselkurses zu erwarten. Eine strenge Konvergenzprüfung vor dem Beitritt zur Europäischen Währungsunion ist im Interesse nicht nur des Euroraums, sondern auch der Beitrittsländer zu empfehlen. Negative Vertrauenseffekte durch den EU-Beitritt mittel- und osteuropäischer Länder sind sodann unwahrscheinlich, zumal das ökonomische Gewicht dieser Länder gering und eine Streckung des Zeitraums zwischen EU-Beitritt und Übernahme des Euro wahrscheinlich ist. Das bestehende Aufwertungspotential des Euro dürfte im Zuge der Erweiterung des Euroraums durch die Stärkung seiner Rolle als internationale Reservewährung etwas zunehmen. Institutionelle Änderungen in der Zusammensetzung der Entscheidungsgremien des Europäischen Systems der Zentralbanken wären bei steigender Zahl der Mitgliedsländer zu erwägen.
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Macroeconomic effects of EU-enlargement to the East - ‘Effects of accession to the EU on prices, wages and aggregate demand in CEE countries’
Hubert Gabrisch, Rüdiger Pohl
,
1999
Abstract
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Comments on Jerger, Jürgen; Spermann, Alexander. Alternative Subsidies for Low-Wage Employment
Lioba Trabert
Externe Publikationen,
1998
Abstract
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Uncovered Workers in Plants Covered by Collective Bargaining: Who Are They and How Do They Fare?
Boris Hirsch, Philipp Lentge, Claus Schnabel
Abstract
In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore, and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 percent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
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