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Dr. Wiebke Szymczak

Dr. Wiebke Szymczak
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/25

Leiterin des Forschungsdatenzentrums

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Verhaltensökonomie
  • experimentelle Finanzökonomie
  • Vertragsgestaltung bei Externalitäten
  • Nachhaltigkeit in der Management- und Organisationsökonomie

Wiebke Szymczak ist seit 2024 wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am IWH und seit Januar 2025 Leiterin des Forschungsdatenzentrums. Ihre Forschungsinteressen liegen im Bereich der empirischen und angewandten Mikroökonomie, insbesondere Management- und Organisationsökonomie, Vertragsgestaltung und Wirtschaftsethik.

Wiebke Szymczak studierte an der Universität Hamburg und promovierte an der Universität Liechtenstein. Bevor sie zum IWH kam, war sie Postdoktorandin und Dozentin für Nachhaltiges Wirtschaften an der Universität Hamburg.

Ihr Kontakt

Dr. Wiebke Szymczak
Dr. Wiebke Szymczak
- Abteilung Forschungsdatenzentrum
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-862 Persönliche Seite LinkedIn Profil

Publikationen

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When Protecting Children Hits the Bottom Line: Evidence From SDG2000 Firms

Wiebke Szymczak

in: Scandinavian Journal of Management, im Erscheinen

Abstract

Intergenerational justice is a core principle of sustainability, yet empirical metrics on the impact of business on future generations remain scarce. Moreover, evidence suggests that different ESG scores capture distinct dimensions of corporate responsibility, highlighting the need for more targeted assessments. This study examines the relationship between corporate engagement with children’s rights and financial performance using a dataset of 1672 firm-year observations, combining a novel children’s rights benchmark with Refinitiv’s financial and sustainability metrics. Results indicate a negative association between marketplace ratings, assessing firms’ child welfare considerations in marketing, and accounting-based profitability, even when controlling for ESG subscores. However, no similar relationship emerges in stock market performance. These findings highlight potential tensions between corporate responsibility and short-term financial outcomes, emphasizing the role of regulatory frameworks and stakeholder engagement in balancing financial and social objectives.

Publikation lesen
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Climate (In)action? The Relationship between CEO Early-Life Experiences and Corporate Climate Policies

Timo Busch Wiebke Szymczak Simone A. Wagner

in: Ecological Economics, Vol. 237 (November), 2025

Abstract

While the drastic physical impacts of climate change and related natural hazards are increasingly apparent, little is known about the long-term behavioral consequences of climate change-related experiences. Psychological evidence suggests that climate change (CC)-related experiences induce people to make more climate-friendly choices. Building on Upper Echelons Theory and relevant psychological literature, we investigate whether early-life natural hazard experiences of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are associated with more climate-friendly policies during their tenure. Our sample covers decisions taken between 1991 and 2018 by 447 US-born CEOs. While we observe an effect of hazard experiences on climate policies, we do not observe the same effect when focusing only on CC-related experiences. This result is robust across different measures of corporate climate performance.

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The Effect of Different Saving Mechanisms in Pension Saving Behavior: Evidence from a Life-Cycle Experiment

Martin Angerer Michael Hanke Ekaterina Shakina Wiebke Szymczak

in: Journal of Risk and Financial Management, Vol. 18 (5), 2025

Abstract

We examine how institutional saving mechanisms influence retirement saving decisions under bounded rationality and income risk. Using a life-cycle experiment with habit formation and loss aversion, we test mandatory and voluntary binding savings under deterministic and stochastic income. Voluntary commitment improves saving performance only when income is predictable; under uncertainty, it fails to improve performance. Mandatory savings do not raise total saving, as participants reduce voluntary contributions. These results emphasize the role of income smoothing in enabling behavioral interventions to improve long-term financial outcomes.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Delegated Social Responsibility: Is Managerial Prosociality a Source of Agency Cost?

Wiebke Szymczak

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 2, 2026

Abstract

Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principalagent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find that principals set ethically constrained targets and wages that track fairness benchmarks. Agents, however, do not divert resources to stakeholders: transfers are negative on average, and prosocial traits do not increase giving. Instead, contract terms, though unenforceable, systematically shape effort, transfers, and returns. Notably, prosocial agents generate higher total returns. Prosociality appears to mitigate rather than create efficiency losses, suggesting that discretion channels norm-sensitive loyalty rather than stakeholder redistribution.

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