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Dr. Wiebke Szymczak

Dr. Wiebke Szymczak
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/25

Leiterin des Forschungsdatenzentrums

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Verhaltensökonomie
  • experimentelle Finanzökonomie
  • Vertragsgestaltung bei Externalitäten
  • Nachhaltigkeit in der Management- und Organisationsökonomie

Wiebke Szymczak ist seit 2024 wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am IWH und seit Januar 2025 Leiterin des Forschungsdatenzentrums. Ihre Forschungsinteressen liegen im Bereich der empirischen und angewandten Mikroökonomie, insbesondere Management- und Organisationsökonomie, Vertragsgestaltung und Wirtschaftsethik.

Wiebke Szymczak studierte an der Universität Hamburg und promovierte an der Universität Liechtenstein. Bevor sie zum IWH kam, war sie Postdoktorandin und Dozentin für Nachhaltiges Wirtschaften an der Universität Hamburg.

Ihr Kontakt

Dr. Wiebke Szymczak
Dr. Wiebke Szymczak
- Abteilung Forschungsdatenzentrum
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-862 Persönliche Seite LinkedIn Profil

Publikationen

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Climate (In)action? The Relationship between CEO Early-Life Experiences and Corporate Climate Policies

Timo Busch Wiebke Szymczak Simone A. Wagner

in: Ecological Economics, Vol. 237 (November), 2025

Abstract

While the drastic physical impacts of climate change and related natural hazards are increasingly apparent, little is known about the long-term behavioral consequences of climate change-related experiences. Psychological evidence suggests that climate change (CC)-related experiences induce people to make more climate-friendly choices. Building on Upper Echelons Theory and relevant psychological literature, we investigate whether early-life natural hazard experiences of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are associated with more climate-friendly policies during their tenure. Our sample covers decisions taken between 1991 and 2018 by 447 US-born CEOs. While we observe an effect of hazard experiences on climate policies, we do not observe the same effect when focusing only on CC-related experiences. This result is robust across different measures of corporate climate performance.

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The Effect of Different Saving Mechanisms in Pension Saving Behavior: Evidence from a Life-Cycle Experiment

Martin Angerer Michael Hanke Ekaterina Shakina Wiebke Szymczak

in: Journal of Risk and Financial Management, Vol. 18 (5), 2025

Abstract

We examine how institutional saving mechanisms influence retirement saving decisions under bounded rationality and income risk. Using a life-cycle experiment with habit formation and loss aversion, we test mandatory and voluntary binding savings under deterministic and stochastic income. Voluntary commitment improves saving performance only when income is predictable; under uncertainty, it fails to improve performance. Mandatory savings do not raise total saving, as participants reduce voluntary contributions. These results emphasize the role of income smoothing in enabling behavioral interventions to improve long-term financial outcomes.

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A Test of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, Dividend Policy and Algorithmic Arbitrage in Experimental Asset Markets

Tibor Neugebauer Jason Shachat Wiebke Szymczak

in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 154 (September), 2023

Abstract

Modigliani and Miller showed the market value of the company is independent of its capital structure, and suggested that dividend policy makes no difference to this law of one price. We experimentally test the Modigliani-Miller theorem in a complete market with two simultaneously traded assets, employing two experimental treatment variations. The first variation involves the dividend stream. According to this variation the dividend payment order is either identical or independent. The second variation involves the market participation, or not, of an algorithmic arbitrageur. We find that Modigliani-Miller’s law of one price can be supported on average with or without an arbitrageur when dividends are identical. The law of one price breaks down when dividend payment order is independent unless there is arbitrageur participation.

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