German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.

During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.

Die Qualität eines Standorts stellt einen wesentlichen Erfolgsfaktor für ein Unternehmen dar. Wenn sich Gründer für einen Standort entscheiden, dann sollten sie daher die Eigenschaften des Orts, an dem soie sich niederlassen, sorgsam abwägen. Das moderne Rating, das zunächst aus Sicht der Banken die Fähigkeit eines Unternehmens bewertet, seinen Kapitaldienst zu leisten, und das starken Bezug auf Markt- und Wettbewerbskräfte nimmt bzw. nehmen sollte, wird hier um standörtliche Aspekte erweitert. Ein sukzessiver Filteransatz wird entwickelt, mit Hilfe dessen in der ersten Stufe die globalen Erfolgsfaktoren von Branchen herausgearbeitet werden, dann gefragt wird, welche Eigenschaften einer Wirtschaftsregion aus Sicht des Unternehmens erfolgswirksam sind und schließlich geprüft wird, welche Unternehmen oder Branchen für eine Region interessant sind. Daraus ergibt sich ein Portfolio von Möglichkeiten, das sowohl die Sicht des Unternehmens auf alternative Standorte, als auch die Sicht der Bank oder des Wirtschaftsförderers auf interessante Unternehmen schärft.