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Germany’s economy is so bad even sausage factories are closingIWHThe Economist, January 15, 2026
The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association organised a workshop on "Challenges to Financial Stability" on October 19th and 20th, 2023, in Halle (Saale). The workshop presented excellent papers that analysed whether and how financial sector regulation changes, the resulting impact on financial stability, and the associated consequences for the real sector.
The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association is organizing a workshop on "Challenges to Financial Stability" on August 30th and 31st, 2021. We aim for an in-person conference to be held in Halle (Saale), but will switch to a hybrid or virtual format if required by future pandemic developments.
Workshop topics include competition and risk-taking of individual banks, the (e)valuation of climate risks by financial institutions and in financial markets, the stability of the financial sector and its regulation and the role of real estate markets for financial system resilience. The workshop aims at linking young economists interested in related topics and provides a platform to exchange ideas and discuss recent contributions.
Im Rahmen der gemeinsamen Veranstaltungsreihe der Nationalen Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina und des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) zu brennenden europapolitischen Themen diskutieren Lars Feld und Reint Gropp über die Stabilität der Finanzmärkte. Moderiert wird die Veranstaltung von Ursula Weidenfeld.
The workshop focused on financial sector regulation, the resulting impact on financial stability, and the associated consequences for the real sector.
A bank in poor financial shape may have incentives to maintain a lending relationship with a "zombie" firm in order to avoid or delay the recognition of credit losses.
This paper provides a detailed description of an extended version of the ECB's New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) of the euro area (cf. Christoffel, Coenen and Warne, 2008).
This paper analyzes the effects of policy rates on financial intermediaries' risk-taking decisions. We consider an economy where (i) intermediaries have market power in granting loans, (ii) intermediaries monitor borrowers which lowers their probability of default, and (iii) monitoring is not observable which creates a moral hazard problem.
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the transmission of macroprudential policies aimed at limiting bank risk-taking in residential real estate.
We use a quasi-natural experiment to identify the effects of supervision on bank behavior. Under the decentralized structure of U.S. bank supervision, banks in the same geographic area may be supervised by different regulatory offices.
