Moritz Stieglitz

Moritz Stieglitz
Current Position

since 2/17

Economist in the Department of Financial Markets

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association

Research Interests

  • financial stability and banking regulation
  • real implications of monetary and economic policy
  • banking and sovereign debt crises

Moritz Stieglitz joined the Department of Financial Markets as a doctoral student in February 2017. His research focuses on financial stability, unconventional monetary policy, and macroprudential regulation.

Moritz Stieglitz received his bachelor's degree from Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf and his master's degree from Goethe University Frankfurt.

Your contact

Moritz Stieglitz
Moritz Stieglitz
Mitglied - Department Financial Markets
Send Message +49 345 7753-840

Publications

Working Papers

cover_DP_2019-15.jpg

Firm-level Employment, Labour Market Reforms, and Bank Distress

Ralph Setzer Moritz Stieglitz

in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 15, 2019

Abstract

We explore the interaction between labour market reforms and financial frictions. Our study combines a new cross-country reform database on labour market reforms with matched firm-bank data for nine euro area countries over the period 1999 to 2013. While we find that labour market reforms are overall effective in increasing employment, restricted access to bank credit can undo up to half of long-term employment gains at the firm-level. Entrepreneurs without sufficient access to credit cannot reap the full benefits of more flexible employment regulation.

read publication

cover_DP_2019-03.jpg

Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring?

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Moritz Stieglitz

in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 3, 2019

Abstract

Theoretically, bank‘s loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers‘ investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalised banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers‘ performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.

read publication
Mitglied der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft LogoTotal-Equality-LogoWeltoffen Logo