Tournament Incentives and Acquisition Performance

This paper examines the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on corporate acquisition performance. Measuring tournament incentives as the compensation ratio between the CEO and other senior executives, we show that acquirers with greater tournament incentives experience lower announcement returns. Further analysis shows that the negative effect is driven by the risk-seeking behavior of senior executives induced by tournament incentives. Our results are robust to alternative identification strategies. Our evidence highlights that senior executives, in addition to the CEO, play an influential role in acquisition decisions.

15. August 2020

Authors Iftekhar Hasan Marco Navone Thomas To Eliza Wu

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Professor Iftekhar Hasan, PhD
Professor Iftekhar Hasan, PhD

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