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Elevated Uncertainty during the Financial Crisis: Do Effects on Subjective Well-being Differ across European Countries?

Lena Tonzer
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, No. 2, 2019
Abstract
This paper focuses on the effect of uncertainty as reflected by financial market variables on subjective well-being. The analysis is based on Eurobarometer surveys, covering 18 countries over the period 2000–2013. Individuals report lower levels of life satisfaction in times of higher uncertainty approximated by stock market volatility. This effect is heterogeneous across respondents: the probability of being unsatisfied is higher for respondents who are older, unemployed, less educated, and live in one of the GIIPS countries of the Euro area. Furthermore, higher uncertainty in combination with a financial crisis increases the probability of reporting low values of life satisfaction.
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Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?

Claudia M. Buch, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Journal of International Money and Finance, March 2019
Abstract
With the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Central Bank has been granted the power to impose stricter regulations than the national regulator if systemic risks are not adequately addressed at the national level. We ask whether there is a cross-border externality in the sense that a bank’s systemic risk differs when applying a national versus a European perspective. On average, banks’ contribution to systemic risk is similar at the two regional levels, and so is the ranking of banks. Generally, larger banks and banks with a lower share of loans are more systemically important. The effects of these variables are qualitatively but not quantitatively similar at the national versus the European level.
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Interactions Between Regulatory and Corporate Taxes: How Is Bank Leverage Affected?

Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 16, 2018
published in: Journal of Banking and Finance
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Did the Swiss Exchange Rate Shock Shock the Market?

Manuel Buchholz, Gregor von Schweinitz, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 9, 2018
published in: International Review of Finance
Abstract
The Swiss National Bank abolished the exchange rate floor versus the Euro in January 2015. Based on a synthetic matching framework, we analyse the impact of this unexpected (and therefore exogenous) shock on the stock market. The results reveal a significant level shift (decline) in asset prices in Switzerland following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. While adjustments in stock market returns were most pronounced directly after the news announcement, the variance was elevated for some weeks, indicating signs of increased uncertainty and potentially negative consequences for the real economy.
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Comments on “Consultation BCBS discussion paper on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures”

Michael Koetter, Lena Tonzer
Einzelveröffentlichungen, 2018
Abstract
The BCBS discussion paper on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures addresses a so far hardly touched topic as concerns capital regulation. While the regulatory framework has been changed substantially over recent years including the establishment of the European Banking Union, risk weights on sovereign exposures have remained mostly unchanged and sovereign exposures of banks benefit from a favourable capital treatment. This applies despite the fact that the recent European sovereign debt crisis has revealed the potential of a doom loop between bank and sovereign risk and demonstrated that sovereign exposures are by no means “risk-free”. The paper is thus an important proposal how to change the risk evaluation of banks’ sovereign exposures.
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Welche Faktoren verzögern die Umsetzung der Bankenunion?

Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Wirtschaft im Wandel, No. 1, 2018
Abstract
Die Europäische Kommission hat weitreichende Reformen zur Regulierung und Überwachung des europäischen Bankensektors beschlossen, um die Stabilität europäischer Banken zu gewährleisten. In den meisten Mitgliedsländern verzögert sich allerdings die Umsetzung der zugrunde liegenden Richtlinien der Europäischen Kommission. Dieser Beitrag geht den Gründen für diese Verzögerung nach. Es zeigt sich, dass insbesondere bereits existierende Regulierungen und institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen das Tempo der Umsetzung entscheidend bestimmen. Entgegen populären Meinungsäußerungen sind die Struktur der Bankensektoren in den Mitgliedstaaten und politische Faktoren hingegen von nachrangiger Bedeutung.
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Aktuelle Trends: Große deutsche Banken werden kleiner und haben mehr Eigenkapital

Lena Tonzer, Talina Sondershaus
Wirtschaft im Wandel, No. 4, 2017
Abstract
Große Banken profitieren in der Regel von einem „Toobig- to-fail“-Status: Sie sind „zu groß, um zu scheitern“. Vor der letzten Finanzkrise, die im Jahr 2007 begann, haben die Vermögenswerte der großen Banken in Deutschland durchschnittlich zugenommen. Je größer der Marktanteil und die Vernetzung großer Banken, desto größer sind die systemischen Auswirkungen, falls eine Bank in Schieflage gerät. Aus Angst vor einem systemischen Zusammenbruch werden deshalb oft staatliche Garantien ausgesprochen oder Eigenkapital bereitgestellt. Wenn große Banken die Rettung durch den Staat antizipieren, kann das dazu führen, dass sie riskantere Geschäfte eingehen. Diese Problematik kam in der letzten Krise zum Tragen, sodass zahlreiche regulatorische Änderungen beschlossen wurden, um das systemische Risiko großer Banken zu reduzieren.
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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation

Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 24, 2017
published in: European Journal of Political Economy
Abstract

To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.

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Macroprudential Policy and Intra-group Dynamics: The Effects of Reserve Requirements in Brazil

Chris Becker, Matias Ossandon Busch, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 21, 2017
published in: Journal of Corporate Finance
Abstract

This paper examines whether intra-group dynamics matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using novel bank-level data on the Brazilian banking system, we investigate the effect of reserve requirements targeting headquarter banks’ deposit share on credit supply by their municipal bank branches. For identification purposes, we exploit that reserve requirements are adjusted following global economic cycles. Our results reveal a lending channel of reserve requirements for branches whose parent banks are more exposed to targeted deposits. Branch ownership and exposure to internal liquidity are central in explaining the results. Our findings reveal limitations in current macroprudential policy frameworks.

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Nationale Aufsicht versus Europäische Bankenunion: Unterscheidet sich die Beurteilung der Einflussfaktoren systemischen Risikos von Banken?

Thomas Krause, Talina Sondershaus, Lena Tonzer
Wirtschaft im Wandel, No. 3, 2017
Abstract
Als Reaktion auf die Finanzkrise unterliegt das Finanzsystem zahlreichen neuen regulatorischen Änderungen. Zum einen wurden bestehende mikroprudenzielle Regeln für Eigenkapital und Liquidität verschärft. Zum anderen wurden makroprudenzielle Instrumente eingeführt. Makroprudenzielle Regulierung hat dabei zum Ziel, systemische Risiken im Finanzsystem frühzeitig zu erkennen, zu reduzieren und somit die Finanzmarktstabilität zu erhöhen. Zudem wurde mit der Einführung der Bankenunion die Aufsicht der größten Banken des Euroraums der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) übertragen. Diese Studie untersucht, ob das systemische Risiko von Banken unterschiedlich groß ist, wenn eine europäische im Vergleich zu einer nationalen Perspektive eingenommen wird. Im Anschluss wird die Frage geklärt, welche Faktoren systemisches Risiko beeinflussen und ob sich diese Faktoren zwischen der nationalen und europäischen Ebene unterscheiden. Es zeigt sich, dass Banken auf nationaler Ebene im Durchschnitt etwas mehr zum systemischen Risiko beitragen, wobei es große Unterschiede zwischen Banken und Ländern gibt. Zudem haben größere und profitablere Banken sowie Banken, deren Geschäftsmodell durch eine geringere Kreditvergabe geprägt ist, ein höheres systemisches Risiko.
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