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Germany’s economy is so bad even sausage factories are closingIWHThe Economist, January 15, 2026
Traditional models of technology transfer via FDI rely upon technology gap and absorptive capacity arguments to explain host economies’ potential to benefit from technological spillovers. This paper emphasizes foreign affiliates’ technological heterogeneity. We apply a novel approach differentiating extent and intensity of backward linkages between foreign affiliates and local suppliers. We use survey data on 809 foreign affiliates in five transition economies. Our evidence shows that foreign affiliates’ technological capability, embeddedness and autonomy are positively related to knowledge transfer via backward linkages. In contrast to what is widely assumed, we find a non-linear relationship between extent of local sourcing and knowledge transfer to domestic suppliers.
Die nordschwedische Provinz Jämtland zählt zu den am dünnsten besiedelten Regionen Europas und ist aufgrund ihrer ländlich‐peripheren Prägung und einer dispersen Siedlungsstruktur in besonderer Weise gefordert, adäquate Daseinsvorsorgeangebote aufrechtzuerhalten. Im Rahmen einer empirischen Studie wurden die Kinder‐ und Altenbetreuung sowie die Erwachsenenbildung exemplarisch in der Provinz Jämtland dahingehend analysiert, wie die Angebote in diesen Bereichen organisiert sind, wie sich der demografische Wandel auf das Angebot auswirkt und ob Anpassungsprozesse zu beobachten sind. Es zeigte sich, dass es zwar ein deutliches Bewusstsein für die mit dem demografischen Wandel verbundenen Probleme seitens der lokalen Akteure gibt, dass bisher jedoch noch nicht von expliziten Anpassungsprozessen gesprochen werden kann.
Declining union density in many industrialized countries increases interest in alternative forms of employee representation, such as works councils. The German works council is one of the most powerful forms of worker representation in developed countries, but little is known of its causal effect on productivity. The author used a large linked employer-employee panel data set to examine this issue. Comparing firms with and without a works council, the author finds that establishments with a works council are on average 6.4% more productive; but he also presents evidence that this figure underestimates the true productivity effect of works councils.
This study investigates the effect of temporary agency work on the user firm’s productivity. We hypothesise that using temporary agency work to enhance numerical flexibility and to screen job candidates may increase productivity, whereas temporary workers’ lower firm-specific human capital and spillover effects on the user’s permanent employees may adversely affect productivity. Other than the sparse existing literature on this issue, we exploit a large panel data set and control for time-invariant and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity by using the system GMM estimator. We find a robust hump-shaped effect of the extent of temporary agency work on the user firm’s productivity.
With this inquiry we attribute cause for the current and “Great Crisis“ to Veblen's predator. After summarizing origins and manifestations of this crisis we juxtapose Veblen's emphasis upon the predator to other potential causes for crisis and crises. Noted to have emerged when our stock of human knowledge provided for the creation of surplus, Veblen's predator is presented as capable of metamorphosis and also driving evolution of our capitalistic system: whether this means emerging as the businessman in the “era of the machine,“ or the investment banker promoting a financial metaphysics in the current “era of finance.“
Using a large linked employer–employee dataset for Germany with a direct plant-level measure of product market competition and controlling for job-cell fixed effects, we investigate whether relative wages of women benefit from strong competition. We find that the unexplained gender pay gap is about 2.4 log points lower in West German plants that face strong product market competition than in those experiencing weak competition, whereas no such link shows up for East Germany.
We examine whether scientists employed in foreign countries and foreign-educated native researchers are more “entrepreneurial” than their “domestic” counterparts. We conjecture that foreign-born and foreign-educated scientists possess broader scientific skills and social capital, which increases their likelihood that they will start their own companies. To test this hypothesis we analyze comprehensive data from researchers at the Max Planck Society in Germany. Our findings provide strong support for the conjecture that academic entrepreneurship can be stimulated by facilitating the mobility of scientists across countries.
Using a large dataset of 406 subsidized R&D cooperation projects, we provide detailed insights into the relationship between project characteristics and innovation output. Patent applications and publications are used as measures for the innovation output of an R&D project. We find that large-firm involvement is strongly positively related with the number of patent applications, but not with the number of publications. Conversely, university involvement has positive effects on projects’ innovation output in terms of the number of publications but not in terms of patent applications. In general, projects’ funding as measure of projects’ size is an important predictor of the innovation output of R&D cooperation projects. No significant effects are found for the number of partners as (an alternative) measure of projects’ size, for spatial proximity between cooperation partners, for the involvement of a public institute for applied research, and for prior cooperation experiences. We derive conclusions for the design of R&D cooperation support schemes.
To what extent and in what form should the intellectual property rights (IPR) of innovators be protected? Should a company with a large technology lead over its rivals receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited advantage? In this paper, we develop a dynamic framework for the study of the interactions between IPR and competition, in particular to understand the impact of such policies on future incentives. The economy consists of many industries and firms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers in an industry can copy the technology of the leader. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth rate and welfare. The most important result from this exercise is that full patent protection is not optimal; instead, optimal policy involves state-dependent IPR protection, providing greater protection to technology leaders that are further ahead than those that are close to their followers. This is because of a trickle-down effect: providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technology leaders that are less advanced than this threshold.
From a theoretical point of view, it is traditionally assumed that foreign firms possess a centrally accumulated firm-specific technological advantage over domestic firms (see, for example, Findlay, 1978; Dunning, 1979). Given a sufficient level of absorptive capacity and human capital, domestic firms in host economies are able to benefit from various externalities stimulated by the presence of foreign firms.
