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Can Germany’s economy stage an unexpected recovery?Steffen MüllerThe Economist, January 30, 2025
The chief human resource officer (CHRO) role elevates people-related matters to the apex of the firm. Why do some companies’ leading management teams place so much emphasis on human resources while others do not? The present study argues that CHROs’ presence in the C-suite is driven by firms’ imitation of industry peers’ leadership structures as a response to uncertainty. The investigation also sheds light on the moderating role of environmental factors that can influence mimetic isomorphism in HR leadership. Through a longitudinal analysis of large listed firms between 2006 and 2020, the study shows a positive relationship between the prevalence of the CHRO position among firms’ peers and a focal firm having a CHRO in its top management. The results demonstrate that certain types of uncertainty serve as boundary conditions for such copying actions: Industry growth strengthens mimicking behavior while industry dynamism weakens it. There is no clear evidence for the moderating role of industry competition. The findings contribute a neo-institutional view of human resource structures in the top management and strengthen the bond between the strategy and human resource literature.
Using proprietary data from AngelList Talent, we study how startup job seekers’ search and application behavior changed during the COVID-19 downturn. We find that workers shifted their searches and applications away from less-established startups and toward more-established ones, even within the same individual over time. At the firm level, this shift was not offset by an influx of new job seekers. Less-established startups experienced a relative decline in the quantity and quality of applications, ultimately affecting their hiring. Our findings uncover a flight-to-safety channel in the labor market that may amplify the procyclical nature of entrepreneurial activities.
We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios.