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'Rust in peace': Why are Germany’s bridges and schools falling apart?Oliver HoltemöllerThe Guardian, June 3, 2025
This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.
Banks have been operating in a low interest rate environment paired with booming housing markets. For the largest banks in the euro area and the period 2015-2022, we assess whether banks reallocate their foreign loan portfolio backed by real estate as a response to differences in local lending spreads across the home and destination country and conditional on reduced information frictions due to borrowing-country exposures. The main result is that the relative share of foreign real estate backed lending increases in case of return opportunities, and this sensitivity depends on local exposures towards the borrowing country. The result is driven by subsamples for which neither the home nor the borrowing country have implemented macroprudential regulation targeting real estate lending, or for which there is a misalignment in macroprudential policies. Nevertheless, we find limited evidence that the riskiness of real estate backed loans goes up during our sample period, and we discuss potential reasons for this result including the possibility of hidden losses.
We show that the response of banks’ net interest margin (NIM) to monetary policy shocks is state dependent. Following a period of low (high) Federal Funds rates, a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to an increase (decrease) in NIM. Aggregate economic activity exhibits a similar state-dependent pattern. To explain these dynamics, we develop a banking model in which social interactions influence households’ attentiveness to deposit interest rates. We embed that framework within a nonlinear heterogeneous-agent NK model. The estimated model accounts well quantitatively for our key empirical findings.
Our results reveal that higher lending spreads between foreign and home markets redirect real estate backed lending towards foreign markets offering a higher interest rate, which provides evidence for "search for yield" behavior. This re-allocation is found especially for banks with more expertise on the foreign market due to a higher local activity and holds for commercial and residential real estate backed loans. Furthermore, "search for yield" behavior and a resulting increase in foreign real estate backed lending is found when macroprudential regulation is missing or misaligned between a bank’s country of residence and the destination country. When turning to the question of whether the detected search for yield behavior results in more risk, we find that especially better capitalized banks report higher forbearance ratios as they might face less stigma effects compared to low capitalized banks.
Climate change and inequality are critical and interrelated defining issues for this century. Despite growing empirical evidence on the economic incidence of climate policies and impacts, mainstream model-based assessments are often silent on the interplay between climate change and economic inequality. For example, all the major model comparisons reviewed in IPCC neglect within-country inequalities. Here we fill this gap by presenting a model ensemble of eight large-scale Integrated Assessment Models belonging to different model paradigms and featuring economic heterogeneity. We study the distributional implications of Paris-aligned climate target of 1.5 degree and include different carbon revenue redistribution schemes. Moreover, we account for the economic inequalities resulting from residual and avoided climate impacts. We find that price-based climate policies without compensatory measures increase economic inequality in most countries and across models. However, revenue redistribution through equal per-capita transfers can offset this effect, leading to on average decrease in the Gini index by almost two points. When climate benefits are included, inequality is further reduced, but only in the long term. Around mid-century, the combination of dried-up carbon revenues and yet limited climate benefits leads to higher inequality under the Paris target than in the Reference scenario, indicating the need for further policy measures in the medium term.
The Transition Report 2024-25 focuses on industrial policies in the EBRD regions and beyond. Such policies have seen a resurgence, seeking to address market failures such as environmental degradation. However, their track record is mixed. Their growing popularity is shaped primarily by domestic political economy considerations and rising geopolitical tensions. While industrial policies are typically employed by higher-income economies, they are also now used more frequently in economies with less administrative and fiscal capacity to implement them.
The female labor income share update is based on the methodology by Neef and Robilliard (2022). This update provides estimates of the female labor income share for 1990 –2023. This methodological note explains the data sources and methodology in detail, highlighting data availability and new data that was incorporated.
We investigate how shareholder-debtholder conflict of interest affects the corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. Consistent with the notion that board representation grants lenders’ access to private information that helps monitor and influence firms’ tax practice, we find that appointments of affiliated banker directors significantly reduce firms’ tax avoidance behavior, while appointing unaffiliated banker directors shows no such effect. The impact of affiliated banker directors on alleviating tax avoidance is stronger among firms with severer conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders, specifically among firms with weaker corporate governance, higher financial leverage and higher CEO stock ownership.
