Governance and Finance
Corporate governance today is about more than just making profits for shareholders. It now aims to balance the needs of all stakeholders-employees, investors, creditors, and business partners. Good governance helps companies run better, attract talent, gain customer trust, and lower financial costs. Conversely, poor governance can lead to scandals, job losses, and broken contracts.
The “Governance and Finance” research group studies how governance works in modern financial markets. One of the focuses is on how firms choose, motivate, and keep talented leaders, especially CEOs, since exemplary leadership is key to company success.
The group is also interested in investigating how changes in financial markets, like the rise of big shareholders, activist investors, or even creditors, affect company decisions. The goal is to understand how different players and institutions influence company behavior and what that means for the future of business.
Research Cluster
Financial Resilience and RegulationYour contact
- Department Financial Markets
Refereed Publications
Executives with Customer Experience and Firm Performance in the B2B Context
in: European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 55 (7), 2021
Abstract
Purpose:
This paper aims to examine the presence of an executive with customer experience (ECE) in a supplier firm’s top management team (TMT). The role of ECE presence remains understudied in the marketing literature. This study attempts to examine the relationship between ECE presence and firm performance.
Design/methodology/approach:
This paper draws on the resource-based view of the firm and adopts a panel firm fixed effects estimator to test the proposed hypotheses. The empirical analysis uses a sample of 1,974 firm-year observations with 489 unique supplier firms. Selection-induced endogeneity is mitigated through the Heckman procedure.
Findings:
ECE presence improves firm performance. Additionally, firms benefit less from ECE presence if a board member with customer experience (BCE) is also present, if a chief executive officer commands a higher pay slice (compared to other executives), and if a TMT is more functionally diversified. However, ECE presence is particularly beneficial if the overall economy is in contraction. Comparing the functional positions held by ECEs reveals that ECE in the marketing function (as a chief marketing officer) offers the largest benefit to an average supplier firm. ECE presence is also associated with other firm outcomes (e.g. bankruptcy odds, innovation and customer orientation).
The Effect of Language on Investing: Evidence from Searches in Chinese Versus English
in: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 67 (June), 2021
Abstract
This study examines the language effect on investing behavior in local stock markets for local- and foreign-language investors using Google search records. First, we find that attention to a local language stimulates attention to a foreign language, increases abnormal news coverage, and has better predictability on stock returns. Second, investors who do Google searches in the local language react faster to a news event's shock than those who search in the foreign language. Third, only attention to the local language can reduce the price drift of an earnings surprise. Last, firm-level information asymmetry is a channel for local advantage. Therefore, we suggest that investors who use a stock market's local language have a local advantage when seeking more profitable investment opportunities in that stock market.
Equity Crowdfunding: High-quality or Low-quality Entrepreneurs?
in: Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, Vol. 45 (3), 2021
Abstract
Equity crowdfunding (ECF) has potential benefits that might be attractive to high-quality entrepreneurs, including fast access to a large pool of investors and obtaining feedback from the market. However, there are potential costs associated with ECF due to early public disclosure of entrepreneurial activities, communication costs with large pools of investors, and equity dilution that could discourage future equity investors; these costs suggest that ECF attracts low-quality entrepreneurs. In this paper, we hypothesize that entrepreneurs tied to more risky banks are more likely to be low-quality entrepreneurs and thus are more likely to use ECF. A large sample of ECF campaigns in Germany shows strong evidence that connections to distressed banks push entrepreneurs to use ECF. We find some evidence, albeit less robust, that entrepreneurs who can access other forms of equity are less likely to use ECF. Finally, the data indicate that entrepreneurs who access ECF are more likely to fail.
Agency Cost of CEO Perquisites in Bank Loan Contracts
in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 56 (May), 2021
Abstract
This study investigates the association between CEO perquisites and bank loan spreads. We collect detailed data on CEO perquisites from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2015 to study this issue. The empirical evidence supports the agency cost view that the lending banks demand significantly higher returns (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with higher CEO perquisites. We further confirm that the effect of these perquisites remains after we control for various corporate governance and agency cost factors. We conclude that banks consider CEO perquisites as a type of agency cost when they make lending decisions.
VC Participation and Failure of Startups: Evidence from P2P Lending Platforms in China
in: Finance Research Letters, Vol. 40 (May), 2021
Abstract
We investigate how VC participation affects the failure of startups. Using a unique dataset of the survival of peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms in China, we identify two types of failures, bankruptcy, and run off with investors' money. The Competing Risk Model results show that while VC participation reduces bankruptcy hazard, it has little impact on the runoff failures. The findings are robust to the use of matched subsamples that disentangle the influence of pre-investment screening by VC. Further analysis of exit routes reveals that conditional on failure, VC participation is associated with a higher chance of running for the exit.
Working Papers
Common Ownership and CEO Social Ties Across Portfolio Firms
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 9, 2026
Abstract
This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.
Common Ownership, Tacit Know-How, and the Market for Technology
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 3, 2026
Abstract
Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.
Delegated Social Responsibility: Is Managerial Prosociality a Source of Agency Cost?
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 2, 2026
Abstract
Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principalagent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find that principals set ethically constrained targets and wages that track fairness benchmarks. Agents, however, do not divert resources to stakeholders: transfers are negative on average, and prosocial traits do not increase giving. Instead, contract terms, though unenforceable, systematically shape effort, transfers, and returns. Notably, prosocial agents generate higher total returns. Prosociality appears to mitigate rather than create efficiency losses, suggesting that discretion channels norm-sensitive loyalty rather than stakeholder redistribution.
From Rivals to Allies? CEO Connections in an Era of Common Ownership
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 7, 2025
Abstract
Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm’s CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms’ performance.
From Shares to Machines: How Common Ownership Drives Automation
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 23, 2024
read publication
