Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown...
Macro Data Download
Macro Data Download On this page, you will find long time series of macroeconomic...
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Joint Economic Forecast The joint economic forecast is an instrument for evaluating...
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IWH at a Glance The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the...
Macro data interactive
Macro data interactive This service provides time series from official publications (Statistisches Bundesamt (German Federal Statistical Office), Arbeitskreis...
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SSRN Working Papers,
We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.
Basel III Capital Requirements and Heterogeneous Banks
IWH Discussion Papers,
I develop a theoretical model to investigate the effect of simultaneous regulation with a leverage ratio and a risk-weighted ratio on banks‘ risk taking and banking market structure. I extend a portfolio choice model by adding heterogeneity in productivity among banks. Regulators face a trade-off between the efficient allocation of resources and financial stability. In an oligopolistic market, risk-weighted requirements incentivise banks with high productivity to lend to low-risk firms. When a leverage ratio is introduced, these banks lose market shares to less productive competitors and react with risk-shifting into high-risk loans. While average productivity in the low-risk market falls, market shares in the high-risk market are dispersed across new entrants with high as well as low productivity.