Herding Behavior and Systemic Risk in Global Stock Markets
Journal of Empirical Finance,
This paper provides new evidence of herding due to non- and fundamental information in global equity markets. Using quantile regressions applied to daily data for 33 countries, we investigate herding during the Eurozone crisis, China’s market crash in 2015–2016, in the aftermath of the Brexit vote and during the Covid-19 Pandemic. We find significant evidence of herding driven by non-fundamental information in case of negative tail market conditions for most countries. This study also investigates the relationship between herding and systemic risk, suggesting that herding due to fundamentals increases when systemic risk increases more than when driven by non-fundamentals. Granger causality tests and Johansen’s vector error-correction model provide solid empirical evidence of a strong interrelationship between herding and systemic risk, entailing that herding behavior may be an ex-ante aspect of systemic risk, with a more relevant role played by herding based on fundamental information in increasing systemic risk.
Micro Data on Robots from the IAB Establishment Panel
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik,
Micro-data on robots have been very sparse in Germany so far. Consequently, a dedicated section has been introduced in the IAB Establishment Panel 2019 that includes questions on the number and type of robots used. This article describes the background and development of the survey questions, provides information on the quality of the data, possible checks and steps of data preparation. The resulting data is aggregated on industry level and compared with the frequently used robot data by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) which contains robot supplier information on aggregate robot stocks and deliveries.
IWH FDI Micro Database
IWH FDI Micro Database The IWH FDI Micro Database (FDI = Foreign Direct...
IWH Alumni The IWH would like to stay in contact with its former employees. We...
Why They Keep Missing: An Empirical Investigation of Sovereign Bond Ratings and Their Timing
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Two contradictory strands of the rating literature criticize that rating agencies merely follow the market on the one hand, and emphasizing that rating changes affect capital movements on the other hand. Both focus on explaining rating levels rather than the timing of rating announcements. Contrarily, we explicitly differentiate between a decision to assess a country and the actual rating decision. We show that this differentiation significantly improves the estimation of the rating function. The three major rating agencies treat economic fundamentals similarly, while differing in their response to other factors such as strategic considerations. This reconciles the conflicting literature.
Real Estate Transaction Taxes and Credit Supply
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper,
We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the eff ect of house price changes on mortgage credit supply. Based on approximately 33 million real estate online listings, we construct a quarterly hedonic house price index (HPI) between 2008:q1 and 2017:q4, which we instrument with state-speci c RETT changes to isolate the e ffect on mortgage credit supply by all local German banks. First, a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces HPI by 1.2%. This e ffect is driven by listings in rural regions. Second, a 1% contraction of HPI induced by an increase in the RETT leads to a 1.4% decline in mortgage lending. This transmission of fiscal policy to mortgage credit supply is eff ective across almost the entire bank capitalization distribution.
The Joint Dynamics of Sovereign Ratings and Government Bond Yields
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Can a negative shock to sovereign ratings invoke a vicious cycle of increasing government bond yields and further downgrades, ultimately pushing a country toward default? The narratives of public and political discussions, as well as of some widely cited papers, suggest this possibility. In this paper, we will investigate the possible existence of such a vicious cycle. We find no evidence of a bad long-run equilibrium and cannot confirm a feedback loop leading into default as a transitory state for all but the very worst ratings. We use a bivariate semiparametric dynamic panel model to reproduce the joint dynamics of sovereign ratings and government bond yields. The individual equations resemble Pesaran-type cointegration models, which allow for valid interference regardless of whether the employed variables display unit-root behavior. To incorporate most of the empirical features previously documented (separately) in the literature, we allow for different long-run relationships in both equations, nonlinearities in the level effects of ratings, and asymmetric effects in changes of ratings and yields. Our finding of a single good equilibrium implies the slow convergence of ratings and yields toward this equilibrium. However, the persistence of ratings is sufficiently high that a rating shock can have substantial costs if it occurs at a highly speculative rating or lower. Rating shocks that drive the rating below this threshold can increase the interest rate sharply, and for a long time. Yet, simulation studies based on our estimations show that it is highly improbable that rating agencies can be made responsible for the most dramatic spikes in interest rates.