Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
IWH Discussion Papers,
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
Business Cycle Volatility in Germany
German Economic Review,
Stylized facts suggest that output volatility in OECD countries has declined in recent years. The causes and the nature of this decline have so far been analyzed mainly for the United States. In this paper, we analyze whether structural changes in output volatility in Germany can be detected. We report evidence that output volatility has declined in Germany. It is difficult to answer the question whether this decline in output volatility reflects good economic and monetary policy or merely ‘good luck’.
Why do we have an interbank money market?
IWH Discussion Papers,
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.