Effects of the promotion of investment in East Germany
Joachim Ragnitz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 186,
2003
Abstract
Investment in East Germany is heavily subsidized. Econometric estimates based on a treatment approach show that the level of investment is significantly higher in firms being supported by state aid. Nevertheless, capital productivity is lower in East Germany, indicating a misallocation of capital. Additionally, there are negative effects in West Germany due to negative crowding-out effects. Therefore state aid in East Germany should be reduced in the medium run.
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Excessive wage increases dampen capital spending
Klaus Weyerstraß
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 16,
2003
Abstract
Considering the debate about the opposite effects of rising wages for employee’s income and employer’s costs, the relationship between wage changes and investment is being investigated on an econometric basis for the years 1971 to 2003. The results show that the dynamics of investment activity slows down as real wages rise more than productivity increases.
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Unit labor costs and competitiveness - a micro econometric analysis for East Germany
Harald Lehmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 180,
2003
Abstract
The paper stresses the value of unit labour costs as an indicator of competitiveness. It is assumed that there are different advantages by using microeconomic data which additionally allow the use of panelregressive methods. The findings for East German enterprises in the manufacturing industry (1998 to 2000) are that unit labour cost are useful for explaining the profit rate. This indicates that East German firms are facing in-price competition which depends clearly of labour costs. But unit labour costs do not explain the success on supraregional markets which are marked by non-in-price competition.
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Uncovered Workers in Plants Covered by Collective Bargaining: Who Are They and How Do They Fare?
Boris Hirsch, Philipp Lentge, Claus Schnabel
Abstract
In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore, and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 percent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
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