Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Journal of Monetary Economics,
forthcoming
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.
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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
European Journal of Political Economy,
forthcoming
Abstract
Most countries in the European Union (EU) delay the transposition of European Commission (EC) directives, which aim at reforming banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance. We compile a systematic overview of these delays to investigate if they result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems. Transposition delays pertaining to the three Banking Union directives differ considerably across the 28 EU members. Bivariate regression analyses suggest that existing national bank regulation and supervision drive delays the most. Political factors are less relevant. These results are qualitatively insensitive to alternative estimation methods and lag structures. Multivariate analyses highlight that well-stocked deposit insurance schemes speed-up the implementation of capital requirements, banking systems with many banks are slower in implementing new bank rescue and resolution rules, and countries with a more intensive sovereign-bank nexus delay the harmonization of EU deposit insurance more.
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What Drives Discretion in Bank Lending? Some Evidence and a Link to Private Information
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking & Finance,
2019
Abstract
We assess the extent to which discretion, unexplained variations in the terms of a loan contract, has varied across time and lending institutions and show that part of this discretion is due to private information that lenders have on their borrowers. We find that discretion is lower for secured loans and loans granted by a larger group of lenders, and is larger when the lenders are larger and more profitable. Over time, discretion is also lower around recessions although the private information content is higher. The results suggest that bank discretionary and private information acquisition behavior may be important features of the credit cycle.
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Flight from Safety: How a Change to the Deposit Insurance Limit Affects Households‘ Portfolio Allocation
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, A. Mordel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 19,
2019
Abstract
We study how an increase to the deposit insurance limit affects households‘ portfolio allocation by exogenously reducing uninsured deposit balances. Using unique data that identifies insured versus uninsured deposits, along with detailed information on Canadian households‘ portfolio holdings, we show that households respond by drawing down deposits and shifting towards mutual funds and stocks. These outflows amount to 2.8% of outstanding bank deposits. The empirical evidence, consistent with a standard portfolio choice model that is modified to accommodate uninsured deposits, indicates that more generous deposit insurance coverage results in nontrivial adjustments to household portfolios.
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Langfristige Konsequenzen der Finanzkrise 2008/2009: Nachsichtige Regulierung schadet, flexible Löhne helfen
Reint E. Gropp, Carlo Wix
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
Die globale Bankenkrise der Jahre 2008/2009 hatte weltweit signifikant negative Auswirkungen auf die Realwirtschaft, und in vielen Ländern fiel die folgende wirtschaftliche Erholung deutlich langsamer aus als in vorherigen Rezessionen. In den Monaten nach der Insolvenz der amerikanischen Investmentbank Lehman Brothers reduzierten Banken ihre Kreditvergabe an Unternehmen, was zu einem Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit, einem Rückgang an Investitionen und einer Verringerung der Produktivität führte. Während diese kurzfristigen Effekte in der bisherigen Forschung gut dokumentiert sind, sind die langfristigen Auswirkungen von Bankenkrisen bisher weit weniger gut verstanden. Zwei aktuelle Studien unter IWH-Beteiligung zeigen, dass Bankenkrisen generell negative langfristige Effekte auf das Wachstum von Firmen haben, dass die Rettung von schwachen Banken während der Krise mit Produktivitätsverlusten in späteren Jahren einhergeht, und dass diese negativen langfristigen Effekte durch die Existenz inflexibler Löhne verstärkt werden.
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Do Asset Purchase Programmes Shape Industry Dynamics? Evidence from the ECB's SMP on Plant Entries and Exits
Manfred Antoni, Michael Koetter, Steffen Müller, Talina Sondershaus
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 12,
2019
Abstract
Asset purchase programmes (APPs) may insulate banks from having to terminate relationships with unproductive customers. Using administrative plant and bank data, we test whether APPs impinge on industry dynamics in terms of plant entry and exit. Plants in Germany connected to banks with access to an APP are approximately 20% less likely to exit. In particular, unproductive plants connected to weak banks with APP access are less likely to close. Aggregate entry and exit rates in regional markets with high APP exposures are also lower. Thus, APPs seem to subdue Schumpeterian cleansing mechanisms, which may hamper factor reallocation and aggregate productivity growth.
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On the Empirics of Reserve Requirements and Economic Growth
Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Gregor von Schweinitz, Katharina Wendt
Journal of Macroeconomics,
2019
Abstract
Reserve requirements, as a tool of macroprudential policy, have been increasingly employed since the outbreak of the great financial crisis. We conduct an analysis of the effect of reserve requirements in tranquil and crisis times on long-run growth rates of GDP per capita and credit (%GDP) making use of Bayesian model averaging methods. Regulation has on average a negative effect on GDP in tranquil times, which is only partly offset by a positive (but not robust effect) in crisis times. Credit over GDP is positively affected by higher requirements in the longer run.
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Gute Absicht – böses Ende: Die US-Wohnungspolitik als Brandbeschleuniger der Weltfinanzkrise
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
Der Boom auf dem US-amerikanischen Eigenheimmarkt in den frühen 2000er Jahren führte zur schwersten Finanzkrise der vergangenen Jahrzehnte. Wissenschaftler haben unterschiedliche Faktoren dokumentiert, die zum rasanten Anstieg der Immobilienpreise beigetragen haben. Kaum beleuchtet wurde bisher die Rolle der US-Wohnungspolitik, insbesondere die Förderung des privaten Wohneigentums durch den Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Geschichte dieses Bundesgesetzes und seine Auswirkungen auf den Markt für Hypotheken und Wohneigentum seit den späten 1990er Jahren. Infolge des CRA wurden seit 1998 deutlich mehr Hypotheken aufgenommen. Der Anstieg der Immobilienpreise in der Boomphase beruhte zum Teil auf diesem politisch induzierten Anstieg der Hypothekenvergabe. Der CRA ermöglichte es auch Kreditnehmern mit geringerer Kreditwürdigkeit, eine Hypothek aufzunehmen – in der Folge kam es zu vermehrten Zahlungsausfällen. Der CRA hat also zum Boom-Bust-Zyklus auf dem amerikanischen Immobilienmarkt beigetragen. Er kann als Beispiel einer wohlmeinenden Politik gelten, die unbeabsichtigt wohlfahrtsmindernde Wirkungen zeitigt.
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Enforcement of Banking Regulation and the Cost of Borrowing
Yota D. Deli, Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu
Journal of Banking & Finance,
2019
Abstract
We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.
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What Drives Banks‘ Geographic Expansion? The Role of Locally Non-diversifiable Risk
Reint E. Gropp, Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2019
Abstract
We show that banks that are facing relatively high locally non-diversifiable risks in their home region expand more across states than banks that do not face such risks following branching deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s. These banks with high locally non-diversifiable risks also benefit relatively more from deregulation in terms of higher bank stability. Further, these banks expand more into counties where risks are relatively high and positively correlated with risks in their home region, suggesting that they do not only diversify but also build on their expertise in local risks when they expand into new regions.
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