Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Journal of Monetary Economics,
forthcoming
Abstract
A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long.
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Lending Effects of the ECB’s Asset Purchases
Michael Koetter
Journal of Monetary Economics,
forthcoming
Abstract
Between 2010 and 2012, the European Central Bank absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Detailed security holdings data at the bank level affirms an effective lending stimulus due to the SMP. Exposed banks contract household lending, but increase commercial lending substantially. Holding non-SMP securities from stressed EMU countries amplifies the commercial lending response. The SMP also improved liquidity buffers and profitability without compromising credit quality.
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Interactions between Bank Levies and Corporate Taxes: How is the Bank Leverage Affected?
F. Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
ESRB Working Paper Series,
No. 103,
2019
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Spillovers of Asset Purchases Within the Real Sector: Win-Win or Joy and Sorrow?
Talina Sondershaus
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 22,
2019
Abstract
Events which have an adverse or positive effect on some firms can disseminate through the economy to firms which are not directly affected. By exploiting the first large sovereign bond purchase programme of the ECB, this paper investigates whether more lending to some firms spill over to firms in the surroundings of direct beneficiaries. Firms operating in the same industry and region invest less and reduce employment. The paper shows the importance to consider spillover effects when assessing unconventional monetary policies: Differences between treatment and control groups can be entirely attributed to negative effects on the control group.
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What Drives Discretion in Bank Lending? Some Evidence and a Link to Private Information
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking & Finance,
2019
Abstract
We assess the extent to which discretion, unexplained variations in the terms of a loan contract, has varied across time and lending institutions and show that part of this discretion is due to private information that lenders have on their borrowers. We find that discretion is lower for secured loans and loans granted by a larger group of lenders, and is larger when the lenders are larger and more profitable. Over time, discretion is also lower around recessions although the private information content is higher. The results suggest that bank discretionary and private information acquisition behavior may be important features of the credit cycle.
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Flight from Safety: How a Change to the Deposit Insurance Limit Affects Households‘ Portfolio Allocation
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, A. Mordel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 19,
2019
Abstract
We study how an increase to the deposit insurance limit affects households‘ portfolio allocation by exogenously reducing uninsured deposit balances. Using unique data that identifies insured versus uninsured deposits, along with detailed information on Canadian households‘ portfolio holdings, we show that households respond by drawing down deposits and shifting towards mutual funds and stocks. These outflows amount to 2.8% of outstanding bank deposits. The empirical evidence, consistent with a standard portfolio choice model that is modified to accommodate uninsured deposits, indicates that more generous deposit insurance coverage results in nontrivial adjustments to household portfolios.
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Langfristige Konsequenzen der Finanzkrise 2008/2009: Nachsichtige Regulierung schadet, flexible Löhne helfen
Reint E. Gropp, Carlo Wix
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
Die globale Bankenkrise der Jahre 2008/2009 hatte weltweit signifikant negative Auswirkungen auf die Realwirtschaft, und in vielen Ländern fiel die folgende wirtschaftliche Erholung deutlich langsamer aus als in vorherigen Rezessionen. In den Monaten nach der Insolvenz der amerikanischen Investmentbank Lehman Brothers reduzierten Banken ihre Kreditvergabe an Unternehmen, was zu einem Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit, einem Rückgang an Investitionen und einer Verringerung der Produktivität führte. Während diese kurzfristigen Effekte in der bisherigen Forschung gut dokumentiert sind, sind die langfristigen Auswirkungen von Bankenkrisen bisher weit weniger gut verstanden. Zwei aktuelle Studien unter IWH-Beteiligung zeigen, dass Bankenkrisen generell negative langfristige Effekte auf das Wachstum von Firmen haben, dass die Rettung von schwachen Banken während der Krise mit Produktivitätsverlusten in späteren Jahren einhergeht, und dass diese negativen langfristigen Effekte durch die Existenz inflexibler Löhne verstärkt werden.
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Do Asset Purchase Programmes Shape Industry Dynamics? Evidence from the ECB's SMP on Plant Entries and Exits
Manfred Antoni, Michael Koetter, Steffen Müller, Talina Sondershaus
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 12,
2019
Abstract
Asset purchase programmes (APPs) may insulate banks from having to terminate relationships with unproductive customers. Using administrative plant and bank data, we test whether APPs impinge on industry dynamics in terms of plant entry and exit. Plants in Germany connected to banks with access to an APP are approximately 20% less likely to exit. In particular, unproductive plants connected to weak banks with APP access are less likely to close. Aggregate entry and exit rates in regional markets with high APP exposures are also lower. Thus, APPs seem to subdue Schumpeterian cleansing mechanisms, which may hamper factor reallocation and aggregate productivity growth.
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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
European Journal of Political Economy,
2019
Abstract
Most countries in the European Union (EU) delay the transposition of European Commission (EC) directives, which aim at reforming banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance. We compile a systematic overview of these delays to investigate if they result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems. Transposition delays pertaining to the three Banking Union directives differ considerably across the 28 EU members. Bivariate regression analyses suggest that existing national bank regulation and supervision drive delays the most. Political factors are less relevant. These results are qualitatively insensitive to alternative estimation methods and lag structures. Multivariate analyses highlight that well-stocked deposit insurance schemes speed-up the implementation of capital requirements, banking systems with many banks are slower in implementing new bank rescue and resolution rules, and countries with a more intensive sovereign-bank nexus delay the harmonization of EU deposit insurance more.
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