Spillover Effects in Empirical Corporate Finance
Tobias Berg, Markus Reisinger, Daniel Streitz
Journal of Financial Economics,
forthcoming
Abstract
Despite their importance, the discussion of spillover effects in empirical research often misses the rigor dedicated to endogeneity concerns. We analyze a broad set of workhorse models of firm interactions and show that spillovers naturally arise in many corporate finance settings. This has important implications for the estimation of treatment effects: i) even with random treatment, spillovers lead to a complicated bias, ii) fixed effects can exacerbate the spillover-induced bias. We propose simple diagnostic tools for empirical researchers and illustrate our guidance in an application.
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Political Uncertainty and Bank Loan Contracts: Does Government Quality Matter?
Iftekhar Hasan, Ying-Chen Huang, Yin-Siang Huang, Chih-Yung Lin
Journal of Financial Services Research,
forthcoming
Abstract
We investigate the relation between political uncertainty and bank loan spreads using a sample of loan contracts for the G20 firms during the period from 1982 to 2015. We find that banks charge firms higher loan spreads and require more covenants during election years when domestic political risks are elevated. Greater differences in the support ratios of opinion polls on candidates lead to the lower cost of bank loans. This political effect also lessens when the government quality of the borrower’s country is better than that of the lender’s country. Better quality government can lower the political risk component of bank loan spreads.
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The Real Effects of Universal Banking: Does Access to the Public Debt Market Matter?
Stefano Colonnello
Journal of Financial Services Research,
forthcoming
Abstract
I analyze the impact of the formation of universal banks on corporate investment by looking at the gradual dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act’s separation between commercial and investment banking. Using a sample of US firms and their relationship banks, I show that firms curtail debt issuance and investment after positive shocks to the underwriting capacity of their main bank. This result is driven by unrated firms and is strongest immediately after a shock. These findings suggest that universal banks may pay more attention to large firms providing more underwriting opportunities while exacerbating financial constraints of opaque firms, in line with a shift to a banking model based on transactional lending.
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Unternehmensinsolvenzen in Deutschland im Zuge der Corona-Krise
Oliver Holtemöller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
Die Corona-Pandemie hat die deutsche Wirtschaft in eine tiefe Rezession getrieben. In diesem Beitrag wird analysiert, wie sich die Rezession in den Unternehmensinsolvenzen niederschlägt. Prognosen auf Basis des üblichen Zusammenhangs zwischen Bruttowertschöpfung und Unternehmensinsolvenzen nach Wirtschaftsbereichen deuten auf eine kräftige Zunahme der Unternehmensinsolvenzen im zweiten Halbjahr 2020 hin. Für Unternehmensinsolvenzen gelten allerdings seit März 2020 Ausnahmeregelungen, die das Ziel haben, allein durch die Corona-Krise bedingte Unternehmensinsolvenzen zu vermeiden. Ferner erhalten die Unternehmen finanzielle Unterstützung im Rahmen der Corona-Hilfspakete. Mit zunehmender Dauer der wirtschaftlichen Beeinträchtigungen nimmt die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Unternehmensinsolvenzen gleichwohl zu, sodass nach Aufhebung der Ausnahmeregelungen Insolvenzen nachgeholt werden dürften und das übliche konjunkturelle Muster wieder greift.
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Local Banks as Difficult-to-replace SME Lenders: Evidence from Bank Corrective Programs
Iftekhar Hasan, Krzysztof Jackowicz, Robert Jagiełło, Oskar Kowalewski, Łukasz Kozłowski
Journal of Banking and Finance,
February
2021
Abstract
In this study, we assess capabilities of different types of banks to cater to the financial needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Using a comprehensive dataset from an emerging economy, including the information on local banks’ corrective programs, we find that local banks remain difficult-to-replace lenders for SMEs. We show that presence of healthy local banks in an SME's vicinity immunizes the SME against the deterioration of access to bank financing linked to other local banks’ corrective programs. In contrast, large banks are unable to replace the lost lending from local competitors under corrective programs.
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Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Moritz Stieglitz
Economic Inquiry,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank‐firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalized banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands‐off approach is associated with improved borrowers' performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.
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Financial Technologies and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Transmission
Iftekhar Hasan, Boreum Kwak, Xiang Li
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 26,
2020
Abstract
This study investigates whether and how financial technologies (FinTech) influence the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. We use an interacted panel vector autoregression model to explore how the effects of monetary policy shocks change with regional-level FinTech adoption. Results indicate that FinTech adoption generally mitigates monetary policy transmission to real GDP, consumer prices, bank loans, and housing prices. A subcategorical analysis shows that the muted transmission is the most pronounced in the adoption of FinTech payment and credit, compared to that of insurance. The regulatory arbitrage and competition between FinTech and banks are the possible mechanisms leading a mitigated monetary policy transmission.
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Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Journal of Monetary Economics,
December
2020
Abstract
A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long.
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Surges and Instability: The Maturity Shortening Channel
Xiang Li, Dan Su
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 23,
2020
Abstract
Capital inflow surges destabilise the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms tend to make their debt redeemable on demand in order to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both firm level and macro level, our main findings are threefold. First, corporate debt maturity shortens substantially during surges, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships. Second, surges change the shape of the interest rate term structure and lead to a more flattened yield curve. Third, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly larger than following surges without one. Our work suggests that debt maturity is key to understanding the consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.
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Executive Compensation, Macroeconomic Conditions, and Cash Flow Cyclicality
Stefano Colonnello
Finance Research Letters,
November
2020
Abstract
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial wealth-for-performance sensitivity. The model shows that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. Moreover, this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. These novel, testable predictions provide insights into optimal shareholder responses to agency costs of debt throughout the business cycle.
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