Mission, Motivation, and the Active Decision to Work for a Social Cause
Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
forthcoming
Abstract
The mission of a job affects the type of worker attracted to an organization but may also provide incentives to an existing workforce. We conducted a natural field experiment with 246 short-term workers. We randomly allocated some of these workers to either a prosocial or a commercial job. Our data suggest that the mission of a job has a performance-enhancing motivational impact on particular individuals only, those with a prosocial attitude. However, the mission is very important if it has been actively selected. Those workers who have chosen to contribute to a social cause outperform the ones randomly assigned to the same job by about half a standard deviation. This effect seems to be a universal phenomenon that is not driven by information about the alternative job, the choice itself, or a particular subgroup.
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Warum Boni im Bankenbereich scheitern (müssen)
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2021
Abstract
In der Finanzkrise sind Boni für Bankmanager in die Kritik geraten. Bonussysteme stehen im Verdacht, Anreize für eine zu riskante Kreditvergabe zu setzen. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel einer großen internationalen Geschäftsbank, wie sich ein Bonussystem, das ein hohes Volumen neu vergebener Kredite belohnt und den Ausfall von Krediten bestraft, auf das Verhalten von Kreditsachbearbeitern auswirkt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kreditsachbearbeiter die Anbahnung neuer und die Überwachung bestehender Kredite verstärken, wenn sie ihren monatlichen Bonus zu verlieren drohen. Eine genauere Prüfung von Kreditanträgen findet dagegen nicht statt. Kreditsachbearbeiter passen ihr Verhalten besonders gegen Monatsende an, wenn die Bonuszahlung herannaht. Langjährige Mitarbeiter reagieren stärker auf das System als jüngere Kollegen. Komplexe Produktivitätsaspekte wie die Teamfähigkeit können mit Bonussystemen nicht erfasst werden.
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Unternehmensinsolvenzen seit Ausbruch der Pandemie
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2021
Abstract
Die Insolvenzzahlen sind trotz Corona-Krise stark gesunken. Aufgrund zahlreicher Großinsolvenzen wie etwa von Esprit, Hallhuber oder Wirecard war das Jahr 2020 bezogen auf die Zahl der betroffenen Beschäftigten trotzdem ein schwieriges Jahr. Eine Insolvenzwelle mit vielen gefährdeten Jobs ab Sommer 2021 ist aufgrund staatlicher Unterstützungsmaßnahmen und abwartendem Verhalten der Unternehmen eher unwahrscheinlich. Soweit es die Pandemielage zulässt, sollten Stützungsmaßnahmen bereits im Jahr 2021 auf den Prüfstand, um eine „Zombifizierung“ der Wirtschaft zu verhindern.
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German Economy not yet Immune to COVID 19 ‒ Outlook Clouded Again The current pandemic wave and supply bottlenecks cause...
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Executive Compensation, Macroeconomic Conditions, and Cash Flow Cyclicality
Stefano Colonnello
Finance Research Letters,
November
2020
Abstract
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial wealth-for-performance sensitivity. The model shows that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. Moreover, this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. These novel, testable predictions provide insights into optimal shareholder responses to agency costs of debt throughout the business cycle.
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Alumni
IWH Alumni The IWH would like to stay in contact with its former employees. We...
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Robot Adoption at German Plants
Liuchun Deng, Verena Plümpe, Jens Stegmaier
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 19,
2020
Abstract
Using a newly collected dataset of robot use at the plant level from 2014 to 2018, we provide the first microscopic portrait of robotisation in Germany and study the potential determinants of robot adoption. Our descriptive analysis uncovers five stylised facts concerning both extensive and, perhaps more importantly, intensive margin of plant-level robot use: (1) Robot use is relatively rare with only 1.55% German plants using robots in 2018. (2) The distribution of robots is highly skewed. (3) New robot adopters contribute substantially to the recent robotisation. (4) Robot users are exceptional along several dimensions of plant-level characteristics. (5) Heterogeneity in robot types matters. Our regression results further suggest plant size, low-skilled labour share, and exporter status to have strong and positive effect on future probability of robot adoption. Manufacturing plants impacted by the introduction of minimum wage in 2015 are also more likely to adopt robots. However, controlling for plant size, we find that plant-level productivity has no, if not negative, impact on robot adoption.
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Tournament Incentives and Acquisition Performance
Iftekhar Hasan, Marco Navone, Thomas To, Eliza Wu
Review of Corporate Finance Studies,
No. 2,
2020
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on corporate acquisition performance. Measuring tournament incentives as the compensation ratio between the CEO and other senior executives, we show that acquirers with greater tournament incentives experience lower announcement returns. Further analysis shows that the negative effect is driven by the risk-seeking behavior of senior executives induced by tournament incentives. Our results are robust to alternative identification strategies. Our evidence highlights that senior executives, in addition to the CEO, play an influential role in acquisition decisions.
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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.
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Wage Delegation in the Field
Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
No. 4,
2019
Abstract
By conducting a natural field experiment, we analyze the managerial policy of delegating the wage choice to employees. We find that this policy enhances performance significantly, which is remarkable since allocated wage premiums of the same size have no effect at all. Observed self‐imposed wage restraints and absence of negative peer effects speak in favor of wage delegation, although the chosen wage premium levels severely dampen its net value. Additional experimental and survey data provide important insights into employees' underlying motivations.
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