The Urban Wage Premium in Imperfect Labour Markets
Boris Hirsch, Elke J. Jahn, Alan Manning, Michael Oberfichtner
The Journal of Human Resources,
forthcoming
Abstract
Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from greater competition in denser labor markets. We show that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. We further document that an important part of the observed urban wage premia can be explained by greater competition in denser labor markets.
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Labour Market Power and Between-Firm Wage (In)Equality
Matthias Mertens
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
This study investigates how labour market power shapes between-firm wage differences using German manufacturing sector data from 1995 to 2016. Over time, firm- and employee-side labour market power, defined as the difference between wages and marginal revenue products of labour (MRPL), increasingly moderated rising between-firm wage inequality. This is because small, low-wage, low-MRPL firms possess no labour market power and pay wages equal to or even above their MRPL, whereas large, high-wage, high-MRPL firms possess high labour market power and pay wages below their MRPL. These wage-MRPL differences grow over time and compress the firm wage distribution compared to the counterfactual competitive labour market scenario. Particularly for the largest, highest-paying, and highest-MRPL firms, wage-MRPL differences strongly increase over time. This allows these firms to generate increasingly large labour market rents while being active on competitive product markets, providing novel insights on why such “superstar firms” are profitable and successful.
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Labour Market Power and Between-Firm Wage (In)Equality
Matthias Mertens
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2020
Abstract
This study investigates how labour market power shapes between-firm wage differences using German manufacturing sector data from 1995 to 2016. Over time, firm- and employee-side labour market power, defined as the difference between wages and marginal revenue products of labour (MRPL), increasingly moderated rising between-firm wage inequality. This is because small, low-wage, low-MRPL firms possess no labour market power and pay wages equal to or even above their MRPL, whereas large, high-wage, high-MRPL firms possess high labour market power and pay wages below their MRPL. These wage-MRPL differences grow over time and compress the firm wage distribution compared to the counterfactual competitive labour market scenario. Particularly for the largest, highest-paying, and highest-MRPL firms, wage-MRPL differences strongly increase over time. This allows these firms to generate increasingly large labour market rents while being active on competitive product markets, providing novel insights on why such “superstar firms” are profitable and successful.
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Do Digital Information Technologies Help Unemployed Job Seekers Find a Job? Evidence from the Broadband Internet Expansion in Germany
Nicole Gürtzgen, André Diegmann, Laura Pohlan, Gerard J. van den Berg
IFAU Working Paper 2018:21,
2018
Abstract
This paper studies effects of the introduction of a new digital mass medium on reemployment of unemployed job seekers. We combine data on high-speed (broadband) internet availability at the local level with German individual register data. We address endogeneity by exploiting technological peculiarities that affected the roll-out of high-speed internet. The results show that high-speed internet improves reemployment rates after the first months in unemployment. This is confirmed by complementary analyses with individual survey data suggesting that internet access increases online job search and the number of job interviews after a few months in unemployment.
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Does Temporary Employment Affect the Work-related Training of Low-skilled Employees?
Eva Reinowski, Jan Sauermann
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung,
No. 4,
2008
Abstract
Using the German Mikrozensus 2004, this paper analyses the effect of temporary contracts on work-related training for low-skilled workers. To take systematic differences between temporary and permanent employees into account, we estimate a bivariate probit model for whether fixed-term employment affects participation in work-related training. We conclude that holding a temporary contract does not have systematic disadvantages in access to further training.
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Does temporary employment influence the workrelated training of low-skilled employees?
Eva Reinowski, Jan Sauermann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
Fixed-term contracts are considerd as one of the most popular instruments of labour market flexibility. Although they provide new labour market options for employer and employees, it is argued that they may lead to decreasing investments in human capital. From the theoretical point of view it is not clear wheter a fixed-term contract is a drawback for the participation in work-related training. The paper deals with the influence of fixed-term contracts on work-related training especially for low-skilled workers. Based on the Micro Census data of 2004, we estimate a bivariate probit model for the probability of fixed-term employment and participating in work-related training. This model enables us to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors. From the estimation results we can conclude that holding a fixed-term contract does not mean a systematical disadvantage for the training probability of low-skilled employees.
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Who Invests in Training if Contracts are Temporary? - Empirical Evidence for Germany Using Selection Correction
Jan Sauermann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 14,
2006
Abstract
This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors, affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.
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