The role of banking portfolios in the transmission from the currency crises to banking crises - potential effects of Basel II
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 21,
2006
Abstract
This paper evaluates the potential effects of the Basel II accord on preventing the transmission from currency crises to financial crises. By analyzing the case study of South Korea, it shows how mismatches on banks’ balance sheets were the primary cause for such a transmission, and models how Basel II would have affected those balance sheets. The paper shows that due to South Korea’s positive credit rating in the months leading up to the crisis, the regulatory capital reserves under Basel II would have been even lower than those under Basel I, and that therefore Basel II would have had adverse effects on the development of the crisis. In the second part, the article analyses whether the behavior of rating agencies has changed since their failure to predict the Asian crisis. The paper finds no robust econometric evidence that rating agencies have started to take micromismatches into account when assigning sovereign ratings. Thus, given the current approach of credit rating agencies, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II to prevent the transmission from currency crises to banking crises, both for the case of South Korea and for potential future crises.
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Money and Credit Market Integration in an enlarging Euro Zone: Methodological Issues
Johannes Stephan, Jens Hölscher
European Economic Policies - Alteratives to Orthodox Analysis and Policy Concepts,
2006
Abstract
“The chapter discusses methodological issues of money and credit market integration within the context of an enlarging Euro area. Common methods of interest parity tests are rejected in favour of a comparison of nominal interest rates. Hölscher and Stephan find that from an institutional point of view the new EU member countries look under-banked, whereas interest rates are converging. As policy implication the paper argues for a Euro adoption of the new EU members rather sooner than later.“
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Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Economic Journal,
No. 513,
2006
Abstract
In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries. A recent World Bank survey reveals that the display of a lender's own borrower information is often not reciprocated. That is, access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data. We argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons. The reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem. This prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent's profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry.
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Forced to Freedom? Empirical Relations between Aid and Economic Freedom
Tobias Knedlik, Franz Kronthaler
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 8,
2006
Abstract
The paper explores the relationships between economic freedom on the one side and development aid and IMF credit as approximation for conditional aid on the other side. After a short review of current literature on the issue of economic development, economic freedom, aid, and IMF credit, the paper develops a simple panel regression model to evaluate the relationship between “economic freedom” as dependent variable and “aid” and “IMF credit” as independent variables. The estimation is based upon data taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. In contrast to previous research, our results allow the rejection of the hypothesis that IMF credit increases economic freedom and that aid is not contributing to economic freedom. The estimation results suggest that, firstly, aid is positively correlated with economic freedom, and secondly, that IMF credit is negatively correlated with economic freedom. Taking IMF credit as proxy for conditional aid, we conclude that for the period of observation it could not be shown that countries can be forced to economic freedom by aid conditions.
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Heterogeneity in Lending and Sectoral Growth: Evidence from German Bank-level Data
A. Schertler, Claudia M. Buch, N. von Westernhagen
International Economics and Economic Policy,
2006
Abstract
This paper investigates whether heterogeneity across firms and banks matters for the impact of domestic sectoral growth on bank lending. We use several bank-level datasets provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank for the 1996–2002 period. Our results show that firm heterogeneity and bank heterogeneity affect how lending responds to domestic sectoral growth. We document that banks’ total lending to German firms reacts pro-cyclically to domestic sectoral growth, while lending exceeding a threshold of €1.5 million to German and foreign firms does not. Moreover, we document that the response of lending depends on bank characteristics such as the banking groups, the banks’ asset size, and the degree of sectoral specialization. We find that total domestic lending by savings banks and credit cooperatives (including their regional institutions), smaller banks, and banks that are highly specialized in specific sectors responds positively and, in relevant cases, more strongly to domestic sectoral growth.
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Monetary Policy and Bank Lending in Japan: An Agency-based Approach
Diemo Dietrich
Incentives and Economic Behaviour,
2005
Abstract
This paper studies the incentive effects on Japanese banks of a low interest rate policy by the Bank of Japan. It utilizes a simplified version of an overlapping principal-agent-style model of corporate finance originally developed in Dietrich (2003). This model is dedicated to study the monetary policy transmission mechanism by combining arguments of the broad credit channel and the bank lending channel taking into account that banks need to be provided with incentives to monitor entrepreneurs. We argue that stipulating banks to possess some amount of own capital generate these incentives. We denote this capital requirement to be market based and show that this requirement depends crucially on interest rates. After revealing some shortcomings of the credit crunch hypothesis, we apply this approach to the Japanese economy. As a result, a policy of very low interest rates may not only be inefficient but counterproductive to reactivate a stumbled economy via the usual credit channel.
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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?
Reint E. Gropp, A. J. Richards
Economic Notes,
No. 3,
2001
Abstract
The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks’ assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks’ risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
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