Real Effects of Bank Capital Regulations: Global Evidence
Yota D. Deli, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking & Finance,
2017
Abstract
We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998–2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth.
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Competition and Contestability in Bank Retail Markets
Reint E. Gropp, C. Kok
Handbook of Competition in Banking and Finance,
2017
Abstract
We examine the role of internet banking in retail-banking competition. The empirical analysis focuses on European banks for the period 2012-15. Building on the idea of contestable markets, we show that internet banking has increased competition through the contestability of markets. The effect is stronger for retail deposits, but recently consumer loans also show an effect. We attribute this finding to the advent of fintechs. These outcomes support the use of non-concentration-based competition measures in banking research.
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15.06.2017 • 26/2017
Ailing banks increase leverage of ailing firms
Euro area countries such as Greece and Spain continue to struggle not only with their banks, but also with highly indebted domestic firms. Michael Koetter from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) and co-authors show the failure to resolve banks’ financial difficulties also prevents debt reduction of over-leveraged firms – and sometimes even contributes to increasing leverage of the weakest firms.
Michael Koetter
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Social Capital and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Bank Loans and Public Bonds
Iftekhar Hasan, Chun-Keung (Stan) Hoi, Qiang Wu, Hao Zhang
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 3,
2017
Abstract
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Do Conventional Monetary Policy Instruments Matter in Unconventional Times?
Manuel Buchholz, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
This paper investigates how declines in the deposit facility rate set by the European Central Bank (ECB) affect bank behavior. The ECB aims to reduce banks’ incentives to hold reserves at the central bank and thus to encourage loan supply. However, given depressed margins in a low interest environment, banks might reallocate their liquidity toward more profitable liquid assets other than traditional loans. Our analysis is based on a sample of euro area banks for the period from 2009 to 2014. Three key findings arise. First, banks reduce their reserve holdings following declines in the deposit facility rate. Second, this effect is heterogeneous across banks depending on their business model. Banks with a more interest-sensitive business model are more responsive to changes in the deposit facility rate. Third, there is evidence of a reallocation of liquidity toward loans but not toward other liquid assets. This result is most pronounced for non-GIIPS countries of the euro area.
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Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
Claudia M. Buch, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.
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24.04.2017 • 22/2017
Higher capital requirements: It’s the firms that end up suffering
61 European banks were scheduled to increase their capital cover by 2012 to provide a sufficient buffer for future crises. As the study by the research group chaired by Reint E. Gropp at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association shows, the banks did implement these requirements – not by raising their levels of equity, but by reducing their credit supply. This resulted in lower firm, investment, and sales growth for firms which obtained a larger share of their bank credit from these banks.
Reint E. Gropp
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International Banking and Cross-border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany
Jana Ohls, Markus Pramor, Lena Tonzer
International Journal of Central Banking,
Supplement 1, March
2017
Abstract
We analyze the inward and outward transmission of regulatory changes through German banks’ (international) loan portfolio. Overall, our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments. These spillovers are, however, quite heterogeneous between types of banks and can only be observed for some instruments. For instance, domestic affiliates of foreign-owned global banks reduce their loan growth to the German economy in response to a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements, and loan-to-value ratios in their home country. Furthermore, from the point of view of foreign countries, tightening reserve requirements is effective in reducing lending inflows from German banks. Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions.
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Mind the Gap: The Difference Between U.S. and European Loan Rates
Tobias Berg, Anthony Saunders, Sascha Steffen, Daniel Streitz
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 3,
2017
Abstract
We analyze pricing differences between U.S. and European syndicated loans over the 1992–2014 period. We explicitly distinguish credit lines from term loans. For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but lower fees, resulting in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. Credit line usage is more cyclical in the United States, which provides a rationale for the pricing structure difference. For term loans, we analyze the channels of the cross-country loan price differential and document the importance of: the composition of term loan borrowers and the loan supply by institutional investors and foreign banks.
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Inside Asset Purchase Programs: The Effects of Unconventional Policy on Banking Competition
Michael Koetter, Natalia Podlich, Michael Wedow
ECB Working Paper Series,
No. 2017,
2017
Abstract
We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.
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