Completing the European Banking Union: Capital Cost Consequences for Credit Providers and Corporate Borrowers
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer
European Economic Review,
September
2022
Abstract
The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks in the European Union (EU). Using the staggered BRRD implementation across 15 member states, we identify banks’ capital cost responses and subsequent pass-through to borrowers towards surprise elements due to national transposition details. Average bank capital costs increase heterogeneously across countries with strongest funding cost hikes observed for banks located in GIIPS and non-EMU countries. Only banks in core E(M)U countries that exhibit higher funding costs increase credit spreads for corporate borrowers and contract credit supply. Tighter credit conditions are only passed on to more levered and less profitable firms. On balance, the national implementation of BRRD appears to have strengthened financial system resilience without a pervasive hike in borrowing costs.
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A Note of Caution on Quantifying Banks' Recapitalization Effects
Felix Noth, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
Unconventional monetary policy measures like asset purchase programs aim to reduce certain securities' yield and alter financial institutions' investment behavior. These measures increase the institutions' market value of securities and add to their equity positions. We show that the extent of this recapitalization effect crucially depends on the securities' accounting and valuation methods, country-level regulation, and maturity structure. We argue that future research needs to consider these factors when quantifying banks' recapitalization effects and consequent changes in banks' lending decisions to the real sector.
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Climate Change-Related Regulatory Risks and Bank Lending
Isabella Müller, Eleonora Sfrappini
ECB Working Paper,
No. 2670,
2022
Abstract
We identify the effect of climate change-related regulatory risks on credit real-location. Our evidence suggests that effects depend borrower's region. Following an increase in salience of regulatory risks, banks reallocate credit to US firms that could be negatively impacted by regulatory interventions. Conversely, in Europe, banks lend more to firms that could benefit from environmental regulation. The effect is moderated by banks' own loan portfolio composition. Banks with a portfolio tilted towards firms that could be negatively a affected by environmental policies increasingly support these firms. Overall, our results indicate that financial implications of regulation associated with climate change appear to be the main drivers of banks' behavior.
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Capital Requirements, Market Structure, and Heterogeneous Banks
Carola Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2022
Abstract
Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.
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Firm-level Employment, Labour Market Reforms, and Bank Distress
Ralph Setzer, Moritz Stieglitz
Journal of International Money and Finance,
February
2022
Abstract
We explore the impact of financial frictions on the employment effect of labour market reforms. Our study combines a new cross-country reform database on labour market reforms with matched firm-bank data for nine euro area countries over the period 1999 to 2013. While we find that labour market reforms are overall effective in increasing employment, restricted access to bank credit can undo up to half of medium to long-term employment gains at the firm-level. Entrepreneurs without sufficient access to credit cannot reap the full benefits of more flexible employment regulation.
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Aspects of the Political Economy of the European Banking Union
Lena Tonzer
PolEconFin Initiative,
2021
Abstract
The regulatory architecture of the financial system has significantly changed after the global financial crisis of 2008/09. In Europe, the introduction of the Single Rulebook has been a major change and provides the legal foundation for the European Banking Union (EBU). The Single Rulebook consists of a regulation, the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), and three main directives targeting capital regulation and compensation of managers, harmonization of deposit insurance schemes, as well as resolution and restructuring rules (Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD), Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)).
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The Nexus between Loan Portfolio Size and Volatility: Does Bank Capital Regulation Matter?
Franziska Bremus, Melina Ludolph
Journal of Banking and Finance,
June
2021
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of bank capital regulation on the link between bank size and volatility. Using bank-level data for 27 advanced economies over the 2000–2014 period, we estimate a power law that relates the volume of a bank’s loan portfolio to the volatility of loan growth. Our analysis reveals, first, that more stringent capital regulation weakens the size-volatility nexus. Hence, in countries with more stringent capital regulation, large banks show, ceteris paribus, lower loan portfolio volatility. Second, the effect of tighter capital requirements on the size-volatility nexus becomes stronger for the upper tail of the bank size distribution. This is in line with capitalization decreasing with bank size, such that larger banks tend to be more affected by increasing capital requirements. Third, in countries with higher sectoral capital buffers, the size-volatility nexus is weaker.
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